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Two thousand years of European history bear witness to the continual
attempts to convert Europe, united as it has been in terms of culture and
civilization since the very beginning of our era, into a political and economic
union. Philosophers and poets alike sang the praises of a united Europe.
1
Introduction
Diverse forces oppose the European Union's (EU) historic struggle 2 to
widen and deepen the confederation.3 As part of the current geopolitical
* Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans, Louisiana.
1. Wim F.V. VANTmooR, EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION SINCE 1848 xiii (1996) (provid-
ing an in-depth historical and economic examination of European monetary union
efforts from 1848 to 1995).
2. This historic struggle began, in part, with three treaties signed in the 1950s. See
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY LAW pt. B2 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAV, pt. B10 (K.R. Simmonds et al. eds., 1992); Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
EEC Treaty].
3. Europe has been radically transformed by the evolution toward European inte-
gration. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE Lj. 2403,
2406 (1990). "The context of European law is being fundamentally trans-
formed . . .embracing the plurality of social, political, economic, and cultural set-
tings ... becoming more pluralistic and indeed plural.., appropriate to our time... of
globalization, post-modernism and fragmentation." Francis Snyder, Editorial, 3 EUR.
LJ. 1 (1997). And all this is a part of "the world transformation occurring all around
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trend, the EU presents today's "most advanced model of. . .economic
internationalisation, going 'beyond trade,' even attempting to 'democratise'
political space beyond nation states."4 The EU, however, is struggling with
the concrete and conceptual re-ordering of economic autonomy and
national authority. The EU must confront the political and economic
evolution 5 and the pending accession of new members. The negotiations
leading to the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty amply illustrate the complexity and
sensitivity of many of these issues.6 None has proved as troublesome or as
telling as the forced march to monetary union and a common currency. 7
"No other... issue in the European Union is more important than whether
and how Economic and Monetary Union will be attained. Success will
have great political consequences and powerfully promote further integra-
tion. Similarly, failure or protracted delays will adversely impact even the
us." Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 771, 774
(1997). The Maastricht Treaty "marks a watershed... "; its monetary union provisions
"form the culminating point of a long and difficult road towards a monetary order for
the Community." Rene Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects, in INTER-
NATIONAL BANKING AND FINANCE SERIES 10 (1997). Professor Brigid Laffan characterized
the unprecedented originality of current European integration as without historical pre-
cedent, fluid in structure and substance, hovering between politics and diplomacy,
states and markets; "that rarest of all historic phenomena, a studied change of
regime.... It is the reverse of conquest and quite different from incremental adjustment,
which is the political norm, and from revolution, which is the social equivalent of an
earthquake." Brigid Laffan, The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalisa-
tion?, 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 2, ' 1 (Oct. 10, 1997) <http://eiop.or.at/
eiyop/texte/1997018a.html> (quoting F. DUCHENE, JEAN MoNNET: THE FIRST STATESMAN
OF INTERDEPENDENCE 20 (1996)).
4. Laffan, supra note 3, at 2, ' 1 (quoting R. O'Donnell, Economic Union, in UNSET-
TLED EUROPE: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN A TRANSFORMED WORLD (1997)).
5. Some term this "constitutional revolution"; others characterize it less dramati-
cally as ordinary statutory construction. See H.W.R. Wade, Sovereignty - Revolution or
Evolution, 112 LAw Q. Rnv. 568, 568 (1996). Former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
often dramatized the historical significance of the advancing integration in his public
speeches. On one occasion, he noted: "[W]e stand at the threshold of the 21st cen-
tury .... More than anything else, the number 2000 signifies hope for a good future.
We look back on a century of extreme contrasts - war and new beginning, fratricide
and European Union." Helmut Kohl, Address Accepting the "Vision for Europe" Prize,
in Press and Information Office of the Federal Government (visited Sept. 17, 1997) <http:/
/www.bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/pm/pm97091701.html>.
6. The accession of new members presents issues of national power in the institu-
tions of the Union, such as reweighting the "qualified majority voting" in the Council
and limiting the number of Commissioners. The Amsterdam Treaty "has been widely
described as disappointing and . . .inconclusive." GEORGE A. BERmANN ET AL., 1998
SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 10 (1998). The very
architecture of the Union will continue its evolution as its numbers grow and processes
are streamlined to enable effective governance. "The administration was originally
designed for a community of six member states; there are now 15, and there could be 25
or more members within 10 years or less." Dick Leonard, Eye on the EU, EUROPE, June
1997, at 4.
7. The Maastrich Treaty and pertinent Protocol impose fixed economic criteria
with timetables on Member States wishing to participate in the single currency. See
Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 109, reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
247, 269-77 (1992) [hereinafter TEU]. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF),
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 57 (1997); EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTITUTE, ANNUAL REPORT
1996, at 52-55 (1997).
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present level of political and economic integration."8
As the European Member States labor to harmonize their economic
strengths within the narrow timetable, conflicting political, economic, cul-
tural, and social ideologies shape the public policy debate.9 Change is the
norm, as Europe's "new socio-economic and political context... [is] char-
acterized by the rapid transition to post-industrialism, increasing globaliza-
tion, sweeping changes in demography and social relations, trends towards
supranational integration and a new 'post-cold war' politics."' 0 Amplifying
this change is the global restructuring movement to streamline business
operations and respond to technological innovation, free trade, and height-
ened competition." In particular, balancing budgets and reducing govern-
ment debt require adjustments to past spending practices in Europe,
calling into question a half century of generous social welfare programs
and economic policy,12 including extensive government ownership of
industry and commercial entities.
Economic fitness for unified monetary control, as measured by com-
pliance with the Treaty's convergence criteria, varies from member to mem-
ber. Conflict and protest have erupted over acceptable ways to trim the
often bloated and unbalanced budgets of the European social-welfare gov-
ernments. As the July 1998 deadline for measuring economic health and
stability approached, 13 the debate sharpened over how best to meet the
8. Bam~um E-r AL., supra note 6, at 7.
9. Professor James Nafzinger recently wrote of the rapid globalization: "Forces of
both integration and fragmentation have gained momentum, as have the complexities of
reconciling competing values. Lawyers face critical issues, for example, at the intersec-
tions of environmental management, economics, human rights, and sovereignty." James
A.R. Nafzinger, Integrating International and U.S. Law: Environmental and Related
Problems, 21 VT. L. Ray. 755 (1997). He cautions that "fundamental policy and legal
issues can be resolved less by 'formal choice, in which the mind is governed by appeals
to consistency, than by life-style choice.'" Id. at 758 (quoting CHRISTOPHER D. STONE,
THE GNAT Is OLDER THAN MAN 280 (1993)). See also Joseph H.H. Weiler, Fin-de-sitcle
Europe: On Ideals and Ideology in Post-Maastrich Europe, in INsTioNAL DYNAMixcs of
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 23, 39 (Deirdre Curtin & Tom Heukels eds., 1994) (providing a
thoughtful essay about the erosion of foundational ideals in European integration, not-
ing that critical value choices are involved in technocratic regimes).
10. FRNcois D. LANFoRD, EUROPEAN FORUM - THE 1998-99 REsEARcH PROJECT:
REcASTING THE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE: OPTIONS, CONSTRAINTs, AcToRS 1 (May 1997).
11. See Gary Minda, Democratic Pluralism in the Era of Downsizing, 33 CAL. W. L.
REv. 179, 180 (1997).
12. Several commentators have concluded that most EU countries will need to
undertake large-scale social security reform, focusing largely on public pension and
health care systems to achieve the criteria. See, e.g., George Kopits, Are Europe's Social
Security Finances Compatible with EMU?: Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment of the
International Monetary Fund 22 (1997) (analyzing the social protection provisions and
convergence criteria country-by-country). "Throughout Europe, the euro, like globaliza-
tion, has proved unforgiving of the inefficiencies of what Germans call the Vaterstaat -
the consoling Father-State... forcing a radical reconsideration of the model of European
society.... The euro is shaking Europe like a massive electric shock." Roger Cohen,
The Cries of Welfare States Under the Knife, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at Al.
13. Finance Ministers of the European Union nations met early in 1998 to review the
1997 economic data from the Member States and decide which nations have strong and
stable enough economies to participate in the introduction of the single currency. The
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required criteria for membership, especially in the countries that enacted
generous social-welfare systems following World War 11.14 Chronic unem-
ployment, emerging as the most destructive economic pressure affecting
economic growth and convergence, undermined much of the hoped-for
progress.' 5 The new Amsterdam Treaty sought higher employment as a
European Community objective, charging the Community with a height-
ened duty to develop a coordinated employment strategy. I 6
Some commentators and experts strongly urge that the member states
postpone the monetary union.'7 The 1997 upset in the French election
and the controversy regarding Germany's gold reserve valuation have
"rekindled speculation that the single currency could be delayed for a year
or two, or even scrapped."' 8 Public opinion polls vary depending on the
state and existing economic trends, but many show a majority of voters
Council of Heads of State is required by the Maastricht Treaty to confirm which mem-
bers have fulfilled the necessary conditions. See TEU, supra note 7, art. 109(j)(4).
14. "Social market economy" denotes a market economy in which the harsher side-
effects of capitalism are tempered by a generous social safety net. See Alan Cowell, Kohl
Offers Plan for Big Cuts In the German Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1996, at Al.
15. "[T]he three major European countries have suffered protracted economic weak-
ness that has been accompanied by a dramatic rise in unemployment to postwar record
levels." INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 1. See also EUROPEAN MONETARY
INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 21-23, 30-34 (citing alarming unemployment and unsatisfac-
tory budget deficits as obstacles to the required economic convergence). For example, in
1997, France and Germany had unemployment rates of 12.6% and 11.6%, respectively.
See Cohen, supra note 12, at A12. Italy's unemployment rate is 12%. See Italian Ousted
Last Week is Restored as Leader, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 1997, at A15. In Germany,
"[o]fficial statistics chronicle record unemployment above 4.4 million (more than 11
percent)." Alan Cowell, Kohl Believes Something Will Turn Up: His Ratings, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1997, at A14. "The EU spends a staggering $240 billion a year" on unemploy-
ment benefits. Bruce Barnard, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs, Europe's Top Priority, EUROPE, Sept. 1996,
at 16.
16. See Treaty of Amsterdam Articles, Oct. 2, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 56 (1998), at 109.
High unemployment reduces tax revenue and increases social assistance outlays. The
funding gap is increased further by the demographic trend of growing retirements; this
causes governments to work diligently just to slow the increase in the deficits, without
reducing them.
17. Even the criteria's staunchest proponents - German bankers and economic advi-
sors - discuss delay. See Europe's Currency, Don't (even mention) Delay, ECONOMIST, Mar.
15-21, 1997, at 51. Some have questioned whether monetary union might run too far
ahead of political union. See, e.g., Niels Thygesen, Why Is Economic and Monetary Union
an Important Objective for Europe?, 14 INr'L REv. L. & ECON. 133 (1994) (discussing the
benefits and disadvantages of economic and monetary union); Walter Goldstein, Europe
After Maastricht, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992-93, at 117 (arguing that the European
Union treaty was premature on conception). See also 30 YEARS OF EUROPEAN MONETARY
INTEGRATION FROM THE WERNER PLAN TO EMU (Alfred Steinherr ed., 1994) [hereinafter
30 YaRS] (discussing issues related to future progress of European Monetary Union in a
series of articles)..
18. Kicking and Screaming into 1999 [hereinafter Kicking and Screaming], ECONOMIST,
June 7-13, 1997, at 20. Four lawsuits have been filed with the German Constitutional
Court to block Germany's participation in the monetary union. The suits allege, among
other things, that the "introduction of the euro would infringe the basic German consti-
tutional right of economic stability." Alan Cowell, 4 Quixotes Tilt at German Adoption of
the Euro, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at A3.
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disfavoring the euro. 19
The efforts to satisfy the membership criteria prompted enormous
debate across the EU, resulting in major changes in some Member States'
social and economic policy. Italy, for example, implemented an aggressive
deficit reduction strategy, cutting $46 billion from its budget and reducing
the budget deficit in half. This brought Italy within the required range of
three percent of GDP.20 In spite of the pain associated with such belt-tight-
ening, an overwhelming consensus of Italians favors monetary union.
2 1
Germany, Austria, France, and most other EU states22 also enacted budget
reforms of varying magnitudes. Unfortunately, the political rhetoric far
surpasses the actual reforms accomplished thus far.23 For example, Ger-
many, a leading force for monetary union, must achieve over $25 billion in
savings.2 4 In fact, "all the Member States except Luxembourg will have to
exert a great deal of political willpower in order to adopt the difficult, and
often unpopular, economic and monetary measures necessary to attain the
Treaty on European Union's . . .mandatory convergence criteria. ' 25
Greece has not yet qualified for the first round of monetary union and
three other nations declined participation in the first round.26 For most,
19. See Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 21 (describing the results of an
opinion poll showing the majority of respondents in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Swe-
den, Britain, and Finland opposed to monetary union). One German poll shows the
German population opposed to a single currency by a three to one margin. See Richard
Medley, Keeping Monetary Union on Track: Time for Another 'Kohl Shock', FOREIGN AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 21. On the other hand, "Euroskepticism" is muted in less economi-
cally developed Member States, such as Portugal, which receive substantial EU contribu-
tions for development. See Samantha McArthur, Portugal's Top Priority: The Euro,
EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 8-9. Portugal receives $10 million a day for infrastructure and
training. See id. at 9.
20. See Commission Puts the Brakes on Euro Aspirations of Italy and Greece,
EUROwATCH, 1997, at 1. Bringing budget deficits within the required limits proved to be
the most difficult of the criteria, with only five Member States satisfying them as of
February 1998. See David Cameron, EMU After 1999: The Implications and Dilemmas of
the Third Stage, 4 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 425, 428 (1997) (highlighting problems in Ireland,
Luxembourg, Denmark, Netherlands, and Finland).
21. See Celestine Bohlen, The Magic Word for Italians: Europe (Pain and All), N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at A8. The popularity in Italy of a single European currency is
understandable: "As a country of small and medium-sized manufacturers that send
70% of their exports to European neighbors, it also has strong economic reasons for not
wanting to be left outside of the common monetary union." Id.
22. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE MEMBER STATES 13-23
(1997) [hereinafter EC SOCIAL PROTECTION] (summarizing trend and Member States'
reforms).
23. The IMF World Economic Outlook states: "[a] -vide variety of reforms have been
implemented across Europe in recent years, but many have been postponed." INTERNA-
TIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 12. It cautioned that the current gradual, piece-
meal approach inadequately addresses the causes of the economic problems. See id.
24. See European Union/Budget, Money, Banking - Special No. 4453 (visited July 16,
1996) <http://www.bundesregierung.de/.bin/lay/ausland/news/specials/specia4453.
html>.
25. GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., 1995 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAv 244 (1995).
26. Denmark opted out of participation in the monetary union when it ratified the
Maastricht Treaty in 1993. British leaders have notified the Council that the United
Kingdom will exercise its right to do the same, though it may participate later. See
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however, inclusion by the EU in the first wave is an economic priority. In
addition to anticipated financial benefits, states fear that exclusion from
the monetary union would reduce their input into economic decisionmak-
ing. Those included in the single currency are likely to dominate such
decisionmaking.
27
Governments reduced deficits by cutting government spending for
social welfare programs and reducing governmental ownership and sup-
port of state-owned industry and commercial interests. As one commenta-
tor described it, "[tlhroughout the EU, everything from public airlines to
telecommunications companies to utilities and broadcasting groups is
being put on the private auction block, to trim down, rejuvenate, and ready
the national economies for the new millennium."
28
The United States is experiencing a similar historic dynamic of eco-
nomic contraction, though for different reasons.29 The conservative "polit-
ical revolution," beginning with the election of the 1994 Republican
Congress, culminated in the landmark 1996 budget legislation and its vast
welfare reform. 30 This legislation reduced many long-standing welfare pro-
Report on the Convergence in the European Union in 1996, European Economy, Supple-
ment A, No. 1, Jan. 1997, at 2. The new Labor Government, however, has endorsed
eventual participation if the introduction of the euro is successful. See What They Said,
INSIDE EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 3 (quoting Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Excheq-
uer). Even though it did not have an official "opt-out" agreement, Sweden has declined
to participate in the processes. See PErER B. KENNEN, THE TRANSITON TO EMU: ISSUES
AND IMPLICATIONS 8 n.7 (1997). One scholar correctly predicted that the first wave
would include 11 Members, excluding only Greece, Britain, Sweden, and Denmark. See
Cameron, supra note 20, at 425. See also Protocol on Certain Provisions Relating to the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 355
(exempting the UK from movement to the third stage and setting forth related provisions
to be annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Community); Protocol on Certain
Provisions Relating to Denmark, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247, 356 (recognizing that Den-
mark shall have an exemption if necessary).
27. "Remaining outside [the] EMU would mean a loss [ofl benefits anticipated from
a favorable assessment by financial markets, in terms of reduced interest premia and
elimination of intra-EU exchange rate risk, and from the ensuing expansion of trade,
investment, growth, and of course, employment." Kopits, supra note 12, at 21. France
and Germany insist on forming a special council of single currency leaders to provide
"indispensable" deeper economic coordination. See France and Germany Act on Single
Currency, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1997, at A12.
28. Ester Lawshway, Privatization: Hopes and Headaches, EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 44.
29. Beginning with President Reagan's rollback of federal welfare entitlements in
1981 and culminating in 1996 with President Clinton's "most sweeping changes,
unprecedented bipartisan support has produced a fundamental change in government
policy, reversing 60 years of policy." Kathleen A. Kost & Frank Munger, Fooling All of
the People Some of the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Val-
ues, 4 VA.J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 3, 24-34 (1996) (describing and criticizing the 1996 welfare
reform).
30. See Jason DeParle, Half the States Unlikely to Meet Goals on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1997, at Al. President Clinton vetoed the first reform bill, but signed the final
effort, having himself campaigned on a promise to "end welfare as we know it." Thomas
A. Loftus, Reforming Welfare: Are Effective Property Rights a Key?, 7 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 387, 387 (1996).
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grams and other social benefits, 31 and re-ordered federal-state relation-
ships by channeling billions of federal welfare dollars through the states.
32
The politically popular themes of balancing the federal budget, downsizing
government, and reforming welfare united to produce this significant
movement in policy and law.
3 3
In contrast to Europe, U.S. governmental spending is more conserva-
tive and less concentrated on social welfare programs,34 and contains more
strident spending cuts in social programs.35 Despite the seeming ideologi-
cal uproar of the 1996 Republican Congress, the demands for a balanced
budget finally gave way to political expediency. "[S]even months
of... stop gap spending measures and partial government shutdowns"
36
ultimately yielded an agreement between Congress and the White House
on a new budget for the 1996 fiscal year. That bill contained substantial
reductions in social spending and rearranged much of the process for
administering social programs. 37 The 1997 budget bill continued the
retooling, but with more compromise and some softening in cuts. 38
A fundamental distinction undergirds the comparative analysis: a
popular election, "in which one vision for the future trumped another,"
39
triggered the welfare "reform" in the United States, while in Europe no
such discreet and direct mandate initiated the deep alterations. In fact,
"faceless central bankers" 40 or "faceless unelected Eurocrats"41 have imple-
mented much of the fiscal discipline behind closed doors. The elite leaders
31. For example, pursuant to the 1996 welfare reforms, the government terminated
disability benefits for 95,000 mentally handicapped and otherwise disabled children.
Benefit cuts averaging $436 a month per child are estimated to save $4-5 billion during
the period from 1997-2002. See Robert Pear, After a Review, 95,000 Children Will Lose
Cash Disability Benefits, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15, 1997, at Al.
32. See DeParle, supra note 30, at A22 (describing the channeling of approximately
$16 billion to the states).
33. See Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 88.
34. The U.S. system is unique among industrialized countries because it maintains
no uniform, universal pension system, no national health care system, no universal fam-
ily allowance, and the welfare programs are limited to specifically defined groups, who
often receive poverty level financial assistance. The American system includes a com-
plex assortment of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, and unemploy-
ment insurance, which are paid for and administered by federal, state, and local
governments. See id. at 12-13.
35. See id. at 10-12, 125. Interestingly, the vocal public protest demanding welfare
cuts in the United States contrasts directly with European protests to preserve social
spending.
36. Jerry Gray, Congress and White House Finally Agree on Budget, 7 Months Into Fiscal
Year, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1996, at Al.
37. SeeJeffrey L. Katz, Provisions: Welfare Overhaul Law, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Sept.
21, 1996, at 2606-2705.
38. See Marianne Means, Clinton Delivers, NEv ORLEANs TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Aug. 9,
1997, at B7.
39. Roger Cohen, Clinging to Its Past, Europe is Warily Awaiting the Euro, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 1997, at Al, A10.
40. Id. EU officials are "unelected, supercilious bureaucrats of Brussels" and Europe
is a "black hole of despair," according to one 1997 British election candidate who
opposed European integration. He claimed that the EU is a German effort to take over
Europe. Id. at Al.
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of Europe use the "invisible hand of the euro"42 to promote their version of
optimal policy for Europe outside traditional political processes.
43
Improving economies in Europe and the United States should lessen
some of the impact that the politicians and economists fear by reducing
some of the deep cuts. In Europe, the long-awaited recovery seems under
way.44 Production, investment, and personal consumption are rising,
inflation is declining, and European companies are improving their com-
petitiveness. 45 The economy in the United States is setting records, with
many calling this time-period the "Clinton boom." 46 Nonetheless, the
debates and decisions leading to these changes create an unusually focused
lens, offering a rare view of public policy choices by national governments.
This Article reviews these collateral developments in Europe and the
United States, searching for convergence in the evolution of the two legal
systems47 and attempts to compare the budget cuts, innovations, and adap-
tations in both.48 First, it compares the economic and governmental
41. Francesco Papadia & Fabrizio Saccomanni, From the Werner Plan to the Maas-
tricht Treaty: Europe's Stubborn Quest for Monetary Union, in 30 YEARS, supra note 17, at
57, 60.
42. Edmund Andrews, Germans Surprise World Economies with a Rate Rise, N.Y.
TiMEs, Oct. 10, 1997, at Al (adopting the frequently used metaphor describing underly-
ing political and economic forces).
43. Commentators see the gap widening between voters and leaders over the single
currency, some favoring a softer, "political" euro, others a stronger, "economic" one. See
Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 21. Columnist George Will terms European
integration "an antidemocratic unity. Europe's political class has arrogantly fostered
unification over the heads of increasingly unpersuaded people." George Will, A French
Raspberry For the New Europe, WASH. POST, June 4, 1997, at A23.
44. See EUROPEAN MONETARY INSTIT=rr, supra note 7, at xiv, 2, 17. See also IwrEluA.
TIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 1-16 (providing individual country summaries
of economic recovery).
45. See Richard I. Fine & Francois Alland, Current Political and Economic Develop-
ments in the European Union, 18 WHITTIER L. Rav. 3 281, 284 (1996).
46. Martin Walker, INSIDE EUROPE, Oct. 1997, at 2. See also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FuND, supra note 7, at 4 ("Already in the seventh year of its expansion, the United States
economy has continued to combine solid growth of output and employment with low
inflation and a diminishing fiscal imbalance."); Richard W. Stevenson, Federal Deficit at
Lowest Point in Two Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at Al ("[T]he economy drove
down the deficit at a stunning rate even before the balanced budget agreement.");Jan M.
Rosen, Fed Sees No Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, at B2 (stating "the economy is
growing enough to keep record numbers of Americans employed but not enough to stir
inflation.").
47. The separate evolutions may produce functionally similar legal changes. For dis-
cussion of parallel or convergent evolution, see RicHARD MILNER, ENCYCLOPEDIA Or
EvOLuriON 93 (1990). See also Mauro Cappelletti, Two Main Convergences Between
Europe and the United States: Constitutionalism and Federalism, 28 REv. JUR. U.I.P.R. 521
(1994) (discussing two main legal convergences: [T]he adoption of binding constitu-
tions and Bills of Rights in post-World War II Europe, and the "even more striking con-
vergence . .. in the area of federalism or transnationalism, e.g. Europe becoming a
United States of Europe.").
48. The comparisons are justified on many grounds: "[T]he Gross Domestic Prod-
uct... of the European Union and the United States fairly compare, both approaching
$7 trillion of GDP [in 1997]. Globally, however, the European Union holds 24% of the
world trade, compared to the United States and Japan with 16% and 12% respectively."
Fine & Alland, supra note 45, at 282. For similar comparisons of European Union,
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changes and the public policy choices reflected in the United States and
Europe. Second, it seeks to ascertain whether these choices represent sys-
temic changes in the traditional models by exploring the extent to which
these economic reforms implicate political and legal reforms. A compara-
tive review of the budget debates discloses similarities and differences in
the diverse political cultures and systems. Some suggested that future
restructuring and adaptations will produce new paradigms in the ordering
of values and priorities. 4 9 The depth and breadth of the trends and issues
raised in these comparisons necessitate that this discussion serve only as a
starting point for further inquiry. This Article endeavors to bring into
focus these two broad continental movements, highlighting issues and
stimulating future research and analysis.
I. Political Uproar in Europe
The wvidespread protests against the new fiscal discipline initiatives under-
score Europe's time-honored commitment to social welfare, a "central
strand of European idealism since the mid 19th century... sharing an
underlying ethos of collective societal responsibility for the welfare of indi-
viduals and the community as a whole."50 The European Union's Social
Charter reflects this commitment to social welfare.5 1 The EU Social Char-
ter promotes basic social provisions across the community, and is included
in the Amsterdam Treaty. After witnessing first-hand both world wars,
Europe embraced a model for accommodating social needs that differed
from the U.S. approach. Western European countries, including Germany,
France, and Italy, promulgated explicit constitutional commitments to
United States, and Japanese economic indicators, see International Economic Implications
of the Euro, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK 24 (June 1997). In addition, the cultural and political inheritance of the
United States from Europe suggests value choice comparisons.
49. SeeJoyce Mushaben, Restructuring the German Sozialstaat: Internal and External
Forces for Change, COLUM. J. EUR. L. 19-24 (forthcoming) (suggesting that German
reforms may have radically altered historic paradigms of the social commitment).
50. Weiler, supra note 9, at 30-31 (drawing on Socialism, Fabianism, Communism,
and Welfare Statism). Germany introduced the first comprehensive social insurance
program in 1883, which became a model for the rest of Europe. See ARTHUR LARSON, 1
LARSON's WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW 2-11 (1997). For a recent informative discussion
of the modern European welfare state, see EUROPEAN WELFARE POLICY, SQUARING ThE
WELFARE CIRCLE (Vic George & Peter Taylor-Goody eds., 1996).
51. In 1989, the Commission promulgated the Social Charter. See Community
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, reprinted in COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SOCIAL EUROPE 48 (Jan. 1990) (issued by the Commission on
Nov. 29, 1989; approved by 11 of the 12 governments at the Strasbourg Council meet-
ing, Dec. 9, 1989) [hereinafter SocIAL CHARTER]. The Commission also announced the
Social Action Program Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action
Program Relating to the Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social
Rights for Workers. Together, these declarations set out a comprehensive EU program of
worker rights. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr., From the Social Charter to the Social Action
Program 1995-1997: European Union Employment Law Comes Alive, 29 CORNELL INT'L LJ.
43, 50 (1996).
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social welfare. 52 Europe's powerful organized labor and socialist parties
advanced legislation to promote worker protection and social cohesion,5 3
thereby strengthening Europe's commitment to social welfare over the past
four decades.
Many Western European countries adopted these guiding principles
and operational structures decades ago. Modern developments, however,
require their adaptation to current economic and social conditions.
Increased payroll taxes financed the many expansions of social protection
in the 1970s and 1980s, however, these policies placed too heavy a burden
on business. 54 Countries are planning to adapt and reform their economic
structures to compete effectively amid the powerful globalization and tech-
nological advances. Recent economic initiatives, perceived as threatening
traditional welfare policies, generated political and labor unrest of epi-
demic proportions. One commentator described labor unrest in Germany
and France as "rebellion ... in Western Europe against the tyranny of the
global nrarket."55 Governments fell and protesters filled streets from Paris
to Bonn, with trucks, people, and livestock.56
Each November since 1995, nationwide strikes by public sector work-
52. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 771, 773 n.8. Seminal European "constitutional"
examples include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953); and the German Constitution, Basic Law of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNuES OF THE WORLD
(Gisbert H. Flanz trans., Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz eds., 1994). Germany
instilled the constitutional character of the Sozialstaat in the Weimar Constitution and
reformulated it in Articles 20 and 28 of the Basic Law after World War II. See
Mushaben, supra note 49, at 3. Interestingly, one scholar suggests that
"[p]aradoxically," the success of turning the modern nation state internally into a wel-
fare state has accelerated the decline of the nation state. Turning the state into an engine
of redistribution impairs its economic vitality, thus causing leaders to seek international
economic cooperation as a means of stimulating economic growth. See John 0. McGin-
nis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International
Federalism, 18 CARt~ozo L. REV. 903, 910-11 (1996).
53. For detailed reports of national and EU social protection provisions, see gener-
ally Dowling, supra note 51; U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY PRO-
GRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 1997 (1997).
54. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 3, 19-23 (Table 1 reflects percentage burden on
payroll). "[E]xisting tax and benefit systems owe many of their features to a bygone era
and have failed to keep pace with changes in the labor market." ORGANISATION FOR Eco-
NOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), THE OECD JOBS STRATEGY 11 (1997).
55. William Pfaff, Why Should a Society's Economic Burdens Be So Lopsided?, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 21, 1997, at 8. Experts suggest that opposition groups have won
public support and deprived reforms of political support. This public opposition ham-
pered reform and ultimately economic recovery. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
supra note 7, at 12.
56. See Craig Whitney, French Truckers' Strike Snarls Freight Traffic Across Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1997, at A4 [hereinafter Whitney, French Truckers']; Craig Whitney,
The More Things Change, the More France Grumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at 4 [here-
inafter Whitney, The More Things Change]; Craig Whitney, Chirac Is Expected to Call
Parliamentary Elections a Year Early, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at All [hereinafter
Whitney, Parliamentary Elections]; Craig Whitney, French Strike Slows Travel in Protesting
Proposed Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1996, at A8 [hereinafter Whitney, French Strike].
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ers, protesting the government's handling of economic matters,57 have par-
alyzed France. The French Government, and the government of at least
three other nations, suffered political consequences after public disap-
proval of budget decisions. The Conservative Government suffered an
unexpected defeat when the electorate rejected the coriservative economic
reforms.5 8 The new Socialist French Prime Minister announced the
"reorientation" of EU integration plans, including a more flexible, growth
oriented approach to the convergence criteria.5 9 In Italy, the coalition Gov-
ernment, previously hailed for its success in turning around Italy's nega-
tive financial trends, fell in October, 1997, after a "bitter battle in
Parliament over how much to cut social programs to qualify for the Euro-
pean common currency."60 The Communists withdrew their support from
the Italian coalition because the budget went too far in reducing social ben-
efits to pensioners and the unemployed.61 Across the channel in Great
Britain, British displeasure brought down the Major government in 1997
and installed Labour Party leader Tony Blair as Prime Minister.62 In Aus-
tria, the coalition government fell in 1995 as a result of its failure to reach a
consensus on the budget. In April 1996, the new Austrian Finance Minis-
ter, Viktor Klima, announced his intention to make Austria's economy via-
ble for a single European currency.
63
57. The three annual public sector strikes in November 1995, 1996, and 1997
proved especially effective because the public sector is so huge. Railroads, public transit,
most air travel, and even banks are in government hands. See Craig R. Whitney, France
on Strike: Not for Better Future, but for a Stable Present, IrNT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 8, 1997,
at 4-5.
58. In the spring of 1997, the rightist government fell "victim to a backlash against
the stringent fiscal requirements for the euro." Id. The cohabitation or power sharing
between conservative President Jacques Chirac and Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jos-
pin began on June 5, 1997, with the announcement of plans to stimulate the economy,
not to cut the budget. See Craig R. Whitney, An Uneasy First Encounter in France's Polit-
ical 'Cohabitation,' N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1997, at AS. At the same time, the new Socialist-
led government was "also marked by a strong, unequivocal commitment to European
integration, including monetary union, but on the condition that it include[d] strong,
equally unequivocal support for Keynesian-inspired growth and job creation." Axel
Krause, Jospin's Socialist Team, EUROPE, July-Aug. 1997, at 16.
59. See Bruce Barnard, EU's Anisterdam Summit, EUROPE, July-Aug. 1997, at 2.
60. Celestine Bohlen, Italian Government Falls in Fight Over Euro Austerity, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, at A10.
61. See id. The Communist Refounding Party subsequently reconsidered their sup-
port after enormous public outcry.
62. "The massive May vote to throw out the Conservatives after 18 years in power
showed the nation was ready for change.. ." and the economy will remain the key for
the Blair government. David Lennon, Tony Blair's Government, EUROPE, Dec. 1997, at 9-
10.."Exit polls found that a key reason voters switched to Labor was their concern about
the widening gap between rich and poor .... Thomas L. Friedman, All About Maggie,
N.Y. TIMms, May 5, 1997, at A15.
63. He explained that the two year austerity plan would include tough spending cuts
but not cost jobs. The new 1996 budget prescribed $9.6 billion in deficit reductions for
the next two years. SeeJanet McBride, Austrian Budget Targets Spending and Jobs, Reuter
European Community Report, Mar. 20, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuec.
File.
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Public protests and strikes repeatedly pressured Western European
governments and business interests from 1995 through 1997. "Strikers vir-
tually shut down Paris for three weeks in December 1995 to protest pro-
posed changes to social security."64 The French Government retreated. 65
In November 1996, French truckers nearly shut down the country's econ-
omy with another effective strike. Thousands of truckers, erecting over 190
road blockades, blocked access to gasoline stations, refineries, border
crossings, and otherwise interfered with commerce for ten days.66 When
the government announced the need to reduce public spending, minimize
inefficiencies, and cut budget deficits, the truckers responded by going to
the streets demanding exactly the opposite: more generous benefits and
reduced working hours. The government relented, giving the drivers the
right to retire at age 55 with full pensions, "with the government agreeing,
despite its austerity policies, to pitch in to help the drivers and their
employers pay for the early retirement plan."67 This constituted a severe
blow to the conservative government's austerity efforts.6 8
The unrest continued in November 1997, when French truck drivers
again erected 150 barricades over key French transit routes, effectively
blocking commerce on north-south European thoroughfares. 6 9 Transit
unions protested the fact that the hard-won reductions in working hours
and financial bonuses negotiated in 1996 had not materialized.70 The
Transport Minister announced that a government decree would impose the
terms of the agreement industry-wide. 7 1 To encourage resolution of the
strike, Socialist Prime Minister Jospin offered to lower the tax on trucks by
$140 per year.72 Commerce resumed after the largest union and the
employers struck a new deal, raising the drivers salaries by three to six
64. Cohen, supra note 12, at A7. See also A Contrary End to the Year, European Social
Policy, Europe Information Service, Jan. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Eursoc. File. The government had proposed raising the retirement age for transit and
train drivers. See Anne Swardson, Truckers' Strike Takes Its Toll on Europe, IN'L HERALD
TRIB., Nov 27, 1996, at 1-2.
At the center of France's restiveness is the Government's commitment to meet a
series of stiff budget and public debt targets so that France can qualify to join a
single European currency in 1999. That in turn has forced the government to
step up a program of privatization of public sector corporations. [M]oves ... to
cut welfare and other benefits are widely unpopular.
Alan Riding, French Trucker's Strike Ends With Indirect Defeat for Government, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1996, at 7.
65. See Riding, supra note 64, at 7.
66. See Swardson, supra note 64, at 1-2.
67. Craig R. Whitney, Chirac's Gamble: Courting the Foes of Social Cuts, IN'L HERALD
TRIB., Apr. 28, 1997, at 5.
68. See Riding, supra note 64, at 7. See also BarryJames, French Trucker Strike Raises
Specter of Chaos on Continent, IN'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 3, 1997, at 1.
69. See Whitney, French Truckers', supra note 56, at A4.
70. See id. (noting that adjacent EU countries complained that the halt in transporta-
tion seriously stalled the flow of goods and services across Europe).
71. See John-Thor Dahlburg, French Trucks Back on Road, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PicA-
YUNE, Nov. 8, 1997, at A-22.





The consistent opposition in France to fiscal discipline efforts, even in
the face of harsh economic realities, enhanced the significance of numer-
ous French protests. The tax concession to truckers, for example, may have
helped to resolve the strike, but the reduction in tax revenues may exacer-
bate the deficit.
The situation is the same in other French industries. In 1996, eight
French unions struck government-owned Air France, shutting it down for a
day. The strike protested the decision to close down eighteen unprofitable
routes and other cost-cutting measures.74 Recent political opposition to
the privatization of France's Groupe des Assurances Nationales, the
unprofitable state-owned financial services company, has waned but only
after the European Commission mandated reform as a condition of
allowing any further subsidies.75 French voters elected a new government
in 1997 based on promises of reduced economic pain, more money for
social benefits, and a shorter workweek. Whether France can reasonably
expect the hoped-for job growth to finance an improved national economy
remains unclear.
76
Concurrently, massive public challenges occurred in Germany, threat-
ening the regime with defiance unless the social contract was maintained.
In March 1997, coal miners and building workers conducted scattered
strikes across Germany, and the leading trade union federation threatened
mass protests if the government insisted on carrying out austerity plans to
cut social spending.77 In June 1996, hundreds of thousands of Germans
protested in the streets of Bonn after the government proposed austerity
measures. 78 Earlier in June, over 300,000 union workers demonstrated in
73. The largest drivers' union signed the deal on Nov. 7, 1997. See Roadblocks Lifted
As French Strike Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at 10.
74. See Alan Cowell, Austerity Plan For Workers is Approved for Germany, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 1996, at 33. Another strike the following April by pilots of Air France Europe,
protesting future lower salaries for new pilots, grounded all flights to and from Paris for
two days. Hospital interns joined the fray and occupied railroad stations and roads,
protesting government austerity measures to control health care spending, and bank
employees briefly struck to show opposition to new work hour rules allowing banks to
open on Saturday. See Whitney, supra note 57, at 4. This entrenched resistance to cut-
ting deficit spending and making operations more efficient has caused concern at many
levels. See id. "With government transfer payments amounting to well over 50 percent
of national income, at least one person out of two is on the receiving end, directly or
indirectly," according to one French economist who favors reducing the government's
role in the economy. Id.
75. See Tom Buerkle, EU Says Paris Can Aid GAN, Then Must Sell It; Ruling Sharpens
a Dilemma Over Jobs, lr'L HERALD TaIB., July 31, 1997, at 11.
76. See France: Politics Meets Mathematics, ECONOMIST, June 14, 1997, at 52. See also
France Still Trapped, EcoNoMisT, July 5, 1997, at 51 (explaining that Jospin cannot fulfill
both campaign promises and still expect to join the single currency.).
77. See Alan Friedman, Germans Growling: Labor Leader Warns of Trouble If Social
Spending Cuts Persist, Ir'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 26, 1997, at 1.
78. See Cowell, supra note 74, at 33 (noting that Parliament had approved legislation
lowering government required sick benefits, and decreasing job security by raising the
number of employees needed for a company to qualify for stricter rules on employee
dismissals).
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Bonn, while some 200,000 from all across Germany protested prior to Par-
liament's vote on the reductions. 79 Twenty-three thousand Daimler work-
ers then boycotted a special weekend work shift, and Opel workers
threatened to walk off the job, claiming they would rather fight than submit
to what they considered inferior "American-type" benefits.8 0
In November 1997, "[tlens of thousands of students marched
through central Bonn ... in a demonstration that crowned weeks of pro-
tests" against the under-funding of the university system as part of Ger-
many's efforts to "pare away a padded welfare state to meet ... plans for a
single currency based on fiscal restraint."8 1 Some 40,000 students from
forty universities descended on Bonn, while students in fifty other colleges
and universities boycotted classes to support the protest.8 2
This widespread unrest illustrates the broader tension across Europe
caused by the social and political forces of economic globalization. This is
particularly true regarding the conflict between single currency policy
needs for fiscal austerity and existing expectations for the maintenance of
European citizens' basic social welfare. Amid this reality of institutional
and philosophical stress, the January 1, 1999, single currency deadline
looms large for many government leaders, as progress with structural
reforms proves slow.
8 3
Though social policy is first a matter for each Member State, the EU
institutions have debated social policy and fundamental rights. Member
States agree that social progress should accompany economic advance-
ment. Member States, however, have divergent views on how best to
accomplish this broadly phrased goal, including the appropriate role for
government in the process.8 4 Thus, "social policy has lagged well behind
that of economic policy."8 5 Nonetheless, the European Commission, act-
ing on its limited authority, issued social action programs and other regula-
79. See id.
80. See Edmund L. Andrews, New Hard Line by Big Companies Threatens German
Work Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at Al.
81. Alan Cowell, Students in Germany Protest Cuts in University Spending, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1997, at A8.
82. See id.
83. OECD reports that only a few countries have introduced and sustained policy
reforms to significantly improve labor market performance. See OECD, Implementing the
OECD Job Strategy - Lessons from Member Countries' Experience at 2, (visited Feb. 20,
1998) <http://www.oecd.sge/min/97study.html>.
84. Note, as well, that 13 of the 15 governments had become left of center by the end
of 1998. See Social Butterflies, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 38 (arguing that social pro-
tection may be back in fashion). A special conference was held in January 1997, under
the Dutch Presidency, to examine positive interplay between social policy and economic
performance. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on "Social Policy and
Economic Performance," at 112, May 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Eclaw
File.
85. CHRISTOPHER HARDING & ANN SHERLOCK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 543 (1995).
Britain's staunch refusal to sign the Social Charter, with the other 11 Member States in
October of 1989, hindered progressive integration efforts. Following the May 1, 1997
election, the Blair government announced that it would accept the Social Charter. See
Social Butterflies, supra note 84, at 38.
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tions to develop the social aspect of the new internal market, including
health and safety measures, equal pay for men and women, and maximum
working hours.
86
The TEU emphasized social policy more than previous treaties, calling
for economic and social progress, and explicitly stating the goals of "a high
level of employment and social protection, the raising of the standard of
living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity
among member States."87 Despite efforts to include the 1989 Social Char-
ter in the TEU, Britain's refusal caused the European Commission to
append it as a protocol. 88 Most recently, Britain's 1997 political transition,
subsequent agreement to the Social Chapter, and its inclusion in the
Amsterdam Treaty marks significant progress.8 9 The TEU also adds a
higher level of employment as a Community objective through the develop-
ment of a coordinated employment strategy.90 Amid the debate and
improved cooperation, this difficult area of social welfare continues to pres-
ent significant challenges to the Member States, as well as EU
institutions.
9 '
86. See Employment and Social Policy 1 (visited Dec. 1997) <http://europa.eu.int/
pol/socio/en/info.ht>.
87. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 2, 1992 OJ.
(C 224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 572 (1992) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Title VIII articulates social
policy, education, and related goals corresponding to these aspirations. Mainly, the
Member States and the Commission are required to cooperate and coordinate with
respect to the Treaty's general objectives. These objectives include social security, collec-
tive bargaining, and occupational safety and health, among others. Art. 118 and art.
118(a) call upon the Council, after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, to
adopt directives establishing technical rules and minimum requirements in these areas.
88. All of the Member States, except the UK, had adopted the 1989 Social Charter,
an aspirational statement of political intent, and the subsequent Protocol on Social Pol-
icy which allowed a "two speed" process on social matters without the UK. See HARDING
& SHERLOCK, supra note 85, at 550-61. For description of European social policy follow-
ing Maastricht, see Elaine A. Whiteford, Social Policy after Maastricht, 18 EUR. L. REv.
202 (1993). See also Employment and Social Policy, supra note 86, at 2.
89. See Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, Ch. IV, arts. 117-19, 1997 OJ. (C340) 1,
30. Member States included the Protocol essentially intact. Britain's earlier refusal to
accede to the Social Charter forced the other Members to craft a special Social Protocol
that would use EU institutions and promote social aims, but without Britain's participa-
tion. See generally Doug Henderson, Opening Statement by British Minister to the EU
(visited May 5, 1997) <http://www.fco.gov.uk/texts/1997/may/05/hendl.txt>. In
November 1997, the UK also signed the Council of Europe's Social Charter, a Treaty
among the Strasbourg-based Council's 40-nation organization. See Council of Europe,
The United Kingdom Signs the Council of Europe Revised Social Charter and the Convention
on the Recognition of Higher Education Qualifications (visited <http://vww.coe.fr/cp/97/
649a%2897%29.html>.
90. The Amsterdam Treaty adds employment provisions to Art. B of the TEU, and
amends Articles 2 and 3 of the TEU by including a special title on employment. See
Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 89, arts. 2-3.
91. InJune 1997, some 80 European scholars issued the Amsterdam Declaration on
Social Quality, emphasizing the importance of social cohesion and solidarity in the
advancing economic union. For an informative article summarizing arguments on all
sides of the reform debate, including a six Member State survey, see Peter Taylor-Goody,
European Welfare Futures, 31 Soc. PoI'Y & ADMIN. 1, 5-16 (1997).
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II. Europe Marches to Monetary Union
In February 1992, over thirty years of efforts toward monetary cooperation
climaxed in the signing of the Treaty of European Union at Maastricht (the
TEU). 9 2 This ambitious agreement supplanted the European Economic
Community with the wider and deeper European Community and Union,
re-emphasizing the goal of creating an "ever closer Union among the Euro-
pean peoples."9 3 While "[c]ommunity competences [were] spectacularly
enlarged,"9 4 including legitimizing intervention into nine new areas, the
TEU especially sought to advance the strongest and most stable currency
in the world. The Treaty set forth guidelines and a timetable for achieving
this goal.95 For the first time in the history of the industrialized world, a
written constitution enshrined economic policy objectives.9 6
The event highlighted the difficult historical development leading to
the accord.97 An economic and monetary union (EMU) 98 represents a
recurring ambition of European leaders, from Jean Monnet's original ideas
of integration in the 1950s to the present.99 The early days illustrated the
benefits of monetary cooperation and currency stability. The extreme
fluctuations in the multiple currencies in Europe placed a heavy burden on
92. See TEU, supra note 7. The Member States negotiated the Treaty in December
1991. All Member States approved it in October 1992. See generally Michael Abbey &J.
Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's" Guide to the Maastricht Treaty, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1329 (1994); HARDING & SHERLOCK, supra note 85, at 4. The Treaty amends and builds
upon the Treaty of Rome, which established the fledgling European Economic Commu-
nity. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 103 (for coordination of economic policies). For
history, see generally Papadia & Saccomanni, supra note 41. For two exhaustive
accounts of the historical unfolding of EMU, see Smits, supra note 3; KENNETH DYSON,
ELUSIvE UNION: THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN EUROPE (1994).
93. TEU preamble, supra note 7. The 12 nations party to the new TEU sought to
build on the successes of the internal market and reach out to expanded areas of cooper-
ation, including economic and monetary cooperation. See id. They planned to expand
their role in areas such as education, public health, consumer protection, the environ-
ment, roads, and communications. The second and third "pillars" established the goals
of forging a common foreign, security, and judicial policy. See id. Ninety pages of the
blueprint focused on monetary union. Two Member States, Denmark and the United
Kingdom, received derogations from monetary union which allowed them to decide at a
later date whether to participate. See Recent Developments in European Community Law
- Maastricht Treaty's Opt-Out Provisions for Denmark Keep EC Intact, 17 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 223, 226 (1994).
94. Renaud Dehousse, Community Competences: Are There Limits to Growth?, in
EUROPE AFrER MAASTRICHT: AN EvER CLOSER UNION 103, 104 (1994).
95. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, arts.
109(j)(1), (3)-(4).
96. See Francis Snyder, EMU - Metaphor for European Union? Institutions, Rules and
Types of Regulations, in EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT: AN EVER CLOSER UNION, supra note 94,
at 68.
97. Though on the agenda for many years, progress proved difficult. See Smits, supra
note 3, at 31-41.
98. The EMU concept comprises an integrated market with a single currency, a com-
mon monetary and economic policy, and a supranational central bank for the European
nations. See JOHN B. GOODMAN, MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY, THE POLITCS OF CENTRAL BANK.
ING IN WESTERN EUROPE 182 (1992).
99. See Smits, supra note 3, at 12-34.
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trade. 10 0 Responding to the currency instability and market turbulence of
the late 1960s,10 1 the European heads of State met at the Hague in Decem-
ber 1969 and resolved to proceed with EMU. They commissioned the Wer-
ner Group to map out a progress plan for accomplishing this goal.' 0 2 The
Werner Report, issued in October 1970, set out a three stage process for
completing EMU in ten years.
10 3
In 1971, the European governments began the first phase of the pro-
gram, specifically the coordination of economic policies. By the mid-
1970s, however, several factors combined to cause a failure. 10 4 The dollar
fell dramatically, the deutsche mark rose, the oil crisis disrupted the econ-
omy on two occasions, and national policies exhibited divergent responses.
This turbulent period stimulated the need for monetary union. In Decem-
ber 1978, European leaders stabilized the currencies and agreed to estab-
lish the European Monetary System (EMS) 'to promote previous goals.
They placed a stronger emphasis on controlling rising inflation.
10 5 Most
significantly, they created the exchange rate mechanism (ERM), wherein
the Member States ceded a degree of national monetary autonomy to the
Community. A central rate limited the adjustable exchange rates of the
countries and prohibited fluctuations of currencies beyond a small per-
centage.10 6 Furthermore, the European nations established a new cur-
rency unit, the ECU (European currency unit), as a weighted average of
100. See DYSON, supra note 92, at 65-71.
101. See id. at 72-83. The Bretton Woods international monetary system, established
in 1945, created the International Monetary Fund and linked world currencies closely
to the U.S. dollar. The system functioned poorly as currencies began to fluctuate
beyond acceptable limits. See id. at 40-46. For an additional description of this period,
see Brian Kurzmann, Challenges to Monetary Unification in the European Union: Sover-
eignty Reigning Supreme, 23 D, v. J. Irr'I. L. & PoI2Y 136, 136-38; GOoDMAN, supra note
98, at 186-87.
102. The Werner Group is named after then Luxembourg premier and finance minis-
ter Pierre Werner. See generally 30 YEAmS, supra note 17, at 10-28 (discussing and print-
ing the text of the Werner Report). For a detailed description of events, see also Smits,
supra note 3, at 15.
103. The Report, later adopted as a resolution by the Council, advocated completing
the single market, limiting the range of currency fluctuation, coordinating the members'
economic policies, and establishing a Community system of cooperation for the central
banks and a center for economic policy decision. The Group submitted the Werner
Report on October 8, 1970. As adopted by the Council in March 1971, the plan articu-
lated a comprehensive definition of the concept of EMU and the building blocks that
would ultimately become the blueprint for the successes of EMU in the 1990s. See Reso-
lution by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States
of March 22, 1971, 1971 OJ. (C 28) 1, reprinted in EuROPEAN CoMMuNTuiEs MoNErARAY
COMMrITEE, COMPENDIUM OF COMMuNITY MONETARY TEXTs 33-37 (1989). See also Papadia
& Saccomanni, supra note 41, at 63; Smits, supra note 3, at 15.
104. See VAur'ooR, supra note 1, at 81-83 (providing a succinct general history of this
period). See id. at 75-95.
105. See Resolution of the European Council on the Establishment of the European
Monetary System (EMS) and Related Matters (Dec. 5, 1978), reprinted in EUROPEAN COM-
MUNTES MONETARY COMMITTEE, supra note 103, at 45-49. All member countries joined
except Britain. See Smits, supra note 3, at 20.
106. European leaders established narrow currency trading bands that allowed fluc-
tuations within limits, generally within plus or minus 2.25%. See Resolution of the
European Council on the Establishment of the European Monetary System and Related
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member currencies. 10 7
The launching of the EMS "gave new impetus to the movement toward
monetary policy coordination." 108 The EMS control techniques strongly
progressed towards limiting exchange-rate variability and achieving signifi-
cant reductions in inflation. 10 9 By the mid-1980s, the rate variability
decreased to half its late 1970s level.110 By 1989, rate variability decreased
by half again.111 A period of economic recovery, coupled with successful
efforts toward developing a truly integrated common market, created
momentum in the cooperative process.112 The push to reduce intra-Com-
munity trade barriers highlighted the onerous currency and banking barri-
ers. Thus, the 1986 Single European Act, the first major amendment to the
original 1957 Treaty of Rome,113 added references of the EMS and ECU to
primary Community law.114 In 1988, the European Council appointed a
special Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union to
develop a blueprint for attaining EMU. 115 The unanimous report of this
committee in April 1989 "defined the monetary union objective as com-
plete liberalization of capital movements, full integration of financial mar-
kets, total and irreversible fixing of exchange rates coupled with the
elimination of margins of fluctuations, and the possible replacement of
national currencies with a single currency." 1' 6 This new report followed
the Werner Report's goal of monetary and economic union, as well as the
three stage format for achieving the union interpretation.' 17
Matters (Dec. 5, 1978), reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MONETARY COMMITTEE, supra
note 103, at 45-49.
107. See id.; Smits, supra note 3, at 21-23.
108. GOODMAN, supra note 98, at 187-88.
109. See id. at 194-95. "[T]he success of the EMS - in terms of both reducing
exchange rate variability and contributing to the convergence of national economic poli-
cies - provided broad support for the notion that a full economic and monetary union
was no longer unrealistic." Id. at 202. "Short-term volatility of rates between EC curren-
cies was substantially reduced thanks to a mixture of converging inflation rates, interest
rate management which targeted the exchange rate, joint intervention in the foreign mar-
kets and capital controls." DYsoN, supra note 92, at 7.
110. See OFFICE OF OFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, ECONOMIC
AND MONETARY UNION 8 (1996).
111. See DYSON, supra note 92, at 8.
112. The Commission, under leadership ofJacques Delors, produced the now famous
Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, which articulated a detailed guide for removing barriers in the Community.
The European Council adopted the White Paper in Milan in 1985. See BERMANN ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 14.
113. See Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 503, 506 (1986) [hereinafter
SEA].
114. Article 1 of the Single European Act terms it "concrete progress towards Euro-
pean unity" and specifically refers to the Council Resolution founding the EMS and
other measures implementing monetary cooperation. Id. For a discussion, see Smits,
supra note 3, at 27-28.
115. See GOODMAN, supra note 98, at 203; Smits, supra note 3, at 28-29, 38-40.
116. COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, REPORT ON ECO-
NOMIC AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY I 18-19 (1989) [hereinafter
DEos REPORT].
117. See id. at 18-19; Smits, supra note 3, at 40-41.
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In its June 1989 Madrid meeting, the European Council approved
most of the Delors Report, setting the first stage of EMU for July 1990.118
In its December 1990 meeting in Strasbourg, the Council called for parallel
inter-governmental conferences (IGCs) to work on the treaty articles and
amendments necessary to complete the EMU and the political aspects of
the integration.1 19 The 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the Communist
regimes in Central and Eastern Europe generated calls for further political
cooperation in Europe. 120 Both IGCs on political and economic coopera-
tion exhibited some compromise and agreement. Ultimately, delay became
normal because the participants could not reach a consensus about a com-
mon foreign and security policy or the further development of EMU.
Finally, in December 1991, after enormous preparatory work by experts
and government officials, including a draft statute for the establishment of
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), the heads of State memori-
alized their ultimate IGC agreements in the Treaty on European Union at
Maastricht. 12 1 The overarching accomplishment of the TEU was its agree-
ment on the single currency as a goal for the turn of the century.
In addition, the EMU would create a central European bank, independ-
ent from political influence, and set tough entry criteria for participants.
The criteria included key economic factors such as exchange rate stability,
inflation rates, government debt, and deficit ratios.122 The negotiation on
these and numerous other issues proved complex and difficult. Ultimately,
however, the Member States acquiesced and signed the Treaty.
123
Among its numerous provisions, the Treaty set forth the goals of close
cooperation on economic policies by the Member States, promoting the
internal and open market economy with free competition 124 based on
"compliance with the... guiding principles: stable prices, sound public
finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of pay-
ments."125 The Treaty articulated a timetable leading to the EMU by retro-
actively setting the first stage to July 1990 (noting that officially the phase
118. See GEORGE A. BERmANN Er AL., EUROPEAN CoMMuNiTY LAW 17 (1993) (providing
a succinct history of monetary and political union efforts).
119. See VANmoOOR, supra note 1, at 97. In the June 1990 Dublin European Council
meeting, the 12 Member States agreed to hold parallel IGCs to work on treaty amend-
ments to establish a political, economic, and monetary union. An IGC is a form of
constitutional drafting conference. See id. at 97-98.
120. See Smits, supra note 3, at 29. After the reunification of Germany in October
1990, the Community shared direct borders with the newly democratic Eastern Euro-
pean states. See id. at 29-30.
121. See generally TEU, supra note 7. See also Smits, supra note 3, at 31. The Euro-
pean leaders placed the common policy for foreign affairs, defense, and justice under
separate pillars or jurisdictions for cooperation, outside normal Community mecha-
nisms. See VAN'mooR, supra note 1, at 101-04.
122. See DYsoN, supra note 92, at 131. Rules binding national budgets necessarily
impinged on national sovereignty. A key compromise between France and Germany
occurred when Germany wanted tough criteria and France wanted a firm timetable. See
id. at 153-57.
123. See id. at 134-58.
124. See TEU, supra note 7, art. 3(a)(1).
125. Id. art. 3(a)(3).
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took effect on November 1, 1993 and ended on December 31, 1993),126
proceeding to the second stage on January 1, 1994, and on to the third
stage onJanuary 1, 1999.127 The second phase created the European Mon-
etary Institute (EMI) to facilitate cooperation among the central banks, pre-
pare for the single currency, and work through the convergence criteria.128
The European leaders designed the third phase to create the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) and establish a single currency. Article 109(j) and subse-
quent protocols permitted Member States satisfying the convergence
criteria to participate in the third stage.
129
InJanuary 1994, the Community entered the second stage, instituting
the EMI within its headquarters in Frankfurt. 130 The EMI issued its first
monetary report in 1995 and Community organs began "the serious coor-
dination of economic and monetary policy."13' Since 1992, the Commu-
nity weathered a crisis in the EMS, a recession, and waning enthusiasm for
the integration process. The Community overcame these obstacles, ulti-
mately gathering steam to proceed again.132
At the 1995 Madrid Council, the heads of State confirmed that the
final stage of EMU would proceed as planned on January 1, 1999. In addi-
tion, the heads of State promulgated the introduction process for the single
currency, the "euro."'133 The introduction of the euro was designed to pro-
ceed in three main stages. 134 First, the actual launch of economic and
126. Stage I began on the basis of decisions taken under the EEC Treaty. See Council
Directive 88/361/EEC, art. 6, 1988 OJ. (L 178) 5, reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
MONETARY CoMMrruu, supra note 103, at 107-08.
127. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, arts.
109(e)(1), 1090)(4). For detailed discussion of the specific policies of the three phases,
see Snyder, supra note 96, at 87-95; Smits, supra note 3, at 41-54.
128. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, art.
109(f). The EMI has accomplished a number of objectives in the first three years; it has
"virtually finalized the conceptual preparations for the ESCB's future monetary policy."
Interview with Alexandre Lamfalussy, Member State Progress Towards Convergence
(last visited May 1997) <http://europa.eu.int/euro/lamfalussy/lamfal.asp>.
129. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, art.
1090). See generally Peter B. Kenen, The Euro: A New Single Currency for Europe?: The
Transition to EMU - Issues and Implications (from conference sponsored by the Washing-
ton University School of Law and the European Studies Program), Oct. 25, 1997, at 1-
21.
130. See BERMANN, supra note 25, at 243.
131. Id. at 244 (discussing the Council's adoption of regulations and decisions about
excessive debt, calculation of financial resources, consultation of the EMI, and Commis-
sion review of excessive deficit levels).
132. A number of scholars discuss the causes and results of this tumultuous period of
economic cooperation (or non-cooperation). See generally Pier Luigi Gilbert, Living
Dangerously: The Lira and the Pound in a Floating World, in 30 YEARS, supra note 17, at
105; Patrick Artus & Henri Bourguirat, The Stability of the EMS, in 30 YEARS, supra note
17, at 143; Alberto Giovanni, The Debate in Nominal Convergence Before and After the
1992 Crisis, in 30 YEARS, supra note 17, at 184; Paul De Grauwe & Giseppi Tullio, The
Exchange Rate Changes of 1992 and Inflation Convergence in the EMS, in 30 YEARS, supra
note 17, at 192.
133. Cameron, supra note 20, at 1.
134. See DiREcToRATE GENERAL XV OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ACcOUNTING FOR
THE INTRODucTION OF THE EURO 8 (1997).
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monetary union began in 1998 with the selection of the six member Execu-
tive Board of the ECB. The Heads of Government met in the European
Council to select the countries permitted to participate in the economic
and monetary union.135 Once the membership was set, the ECB was estab-
lished. The convergence criteria set forth in the Treaty and subsequent
Protocols provided the measures for evaluation. 136 Second, on January 1,
1999, the monetary union will effectively start and the currency exchange
rates among the euro and the Member State currencies will become irrevo-
cably fixed. 137 The European Council and the ECB will begin to regulate
economic issues and impose monetary constraints on national budgets. 138
Third, January 1, 2002, will mark the permanent switch to the
euro. 139 The new banknotes and coins will become the single currency of
the participating Member States. Amounts expressed in national curren-
cies at this time will be converted into euros at the official rates.
At the Amsterdam European Council meeting in June 1997, the heads
of State agreed to reinforce the movement toward the single currency,
adding the Stability and Growth Pact 140 to the apparatus for achieving sus-
tained convergence. The Pact promotes price stability and strong, sustaina-
ble growth to create jobs.14
1
III. Entrance to EMU Through the Convergence Criteria
Treaty article 109(j)(1) and subsequent Protocol 6 set forth the entry con-
ditions for the third stage of EMU: each state must achieve a "high degree
of sustainable convergence,"'142 as established by four criteria: 1) a "high
degree of price stability" evidenced by a rate of inflation which does not
exceed the inflation rates of the three best performing states by more than
1.5%; 2) currency stability, within the normal fluctuations of the ERM for
135. See id. The European Commission (Brussels) and the European Monetary Insti-
tute (Frankfurt) issued assessments to the Council of Ministers regarding the progress
each Member State has achieved in satisfying the criteria for economic union.
136. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, art.
1090).
137. See id.
138. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, arts.
109(0)(3)-(4). The euro will become a currency in its own right and the ECB will
become operational. See id. In addition, stock markets will use the euro. See id. Banks
and other institutions will fashion accounts in both euro and national currencies, in
preparation for the transition and the gradual introduction of dual pricing of goods and
services. See id. For detailed discussion of ECB role and recommended role, see Chris-
tos Hadjiemmanuil, European Monetary Union, The European System of Central Banks,
and Banking Supervision: A Neglected Aspect of the Maastricht Treaty, 5 TuLNaJ. Ir'nL &
CoMP. L. 105 (1997).
139. See DimcrovRAE GENERAL XV OF mE EUROPEAN CoMMi soN, supra note 134, at 8.
140. "The pact consists of two European Council regulations ... which have the force
of law, and a European Council resolution, which gives guidance to the Commission, the
Council, and member states in applying the pact." ITERNATIONAL MoNTARY FUND,
supra note 7, at 58, 57-60.
141. See id. at 58-59.
142. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 92, art.
109(j)(1).
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 32
at least two years; 3) stability of the government's ,"financial position,"
meaning that the Council has not declared the state's deficit excessive; and
4) interest rates which do not exceed by more than two percent the rates of
the best performing states in terms of price stability.143
The Treaty also instructs the European Commission to evaluate the
country's deficit. If the country's deficit is excessive, the European Com-
mission must report to the European Council, which must then ultimately
judge the excessive debt issue. The Council must then take into account
the reports of the Commission and the EMI, the opinions of the European
Parliament, and the Council of Ministers.
14 4
Some uncertainty exists about how strictly the Council must follow
the convergence criteria. European politics and the overall economic con-
vergence will, of course, play a role.145 Budget figures may well be manipu-
lated within a "politically acceptable grey zone," depending on the issues
and states involved. 146 In its January 1997 assessment to the Council, the
Commission reported that "[s]ubstantial progress towards the achievement
of a high degree of sustainable convergence has been made in all Member
States since the beginning of the second stage of EMU. This pro-
gress ... gathered greater momentum during 1996 .... [and] necessary
preparations for the third stage [were] advancing at the national and Com-
munity level."
14 7
The advantages of EMU are compelling: creating a more efficient sin-
gle market by, for example, reducing the costs of doing business and
thereby stimulating growth and employment; making "cross border trans-
actions more attractive by eliminating costs associated with currency con-
version and by eliminating the exposure to exchange risks,"148 fostering
143. See id.; Peter B. Kenen, The Transition to EMU, Issues and Implications, 3-4 COLUM.
INT'L LJ. 359 (1997); Cameron, supra note 20, at 2.
144. For detailed description of the complicated evaluation and decision processes,
see Kenen, supra note 143 (including how the Member States measure up in October
1997, suggesting that most will be close to satisfying the criteria.) See also Cameron,
supra note 20, at 28-29 (suggesting that eleven States will be chosen). In 1996, only
three states were not subject to a Council decision of excessive deficit: Denmark, Ire-
land, and Luxembourg. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN ECONOMY 12, 30-31 Uan.
1997) (presenting analysis of Member States' progress toward convergence).
145. The Treaty refers to the compatibility of each country's laws with the require-
ments of the Treaty and the numerous other economic conditions which the Commis-
sion and the EMI must take into account. This unavoidability leaves some ambiguity in
the process. See Kenen, supra note 143, at 12-14.
146. See Medley, supra note 19, at 23.
147. EUROPEAN ECONOMY, supra note 144, at 28.
148. DIRECrORAT GENERAL XV OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 134, at 4.
Further, the EMU will increase market transparency by "making prices more easily com-
parable." Id. Transaction costs are estimated at 0.3-0.4% of the EU's gross domestic
product, or ECU 220-25 billion. See ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, supra note 110, at
14. Reducing exchange costs will re-order some business practices and profit centers.
For example, the lack of volatility in the foreign exchange market is currently hurting
banks who engage heavily in that trade or speculation, "driven by the narrowing of
inflation rates around the globe, the end of the cold war and the fast approaching Euro-
pean monetary union." Jonathan Fuerbringer, Calm Seas Roll Currency Markets: Trading
Ebbs as Technology Advances, Costing Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, at Dl. "Market
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currency stability; and instituting the collective management of a single
monetary policy that will give greater visibility and predictability to mar-
kets and investment.149 The coordination provided by a central bank
should help keep public deficits under control and foster price stability.
This, in turn, will promote growth, investment, and savings. A more stable
and efficient single market will enable the participating states to compete
more effectively in the global economy.' 5 0
Of course, monetary union has a political side as well. Tensions
among the Member States, distrust between political leaders, and a disillu-
sioned citizenry will help dictate the pace and substance of future pol-
icy.' 15 Former German Chancellor Kohl heavily campaigned for the EMU
and "[t]he construction of a European house," urging repeatedly that Euro-
pean unity is "a matter of war and peace."' 5 2 By the German example, it
appears that Member States pay a price for this new era of economic unity
in the form of political uncertainty. The following section focuses on
efforts to harmonize Member States' economic ambitions with political
realities.
IV. EU Member States
A review of fiscal efforts and goals in the leading EU Member States -
Germany, Austria, France, and Italy - reflects the struggle to streamline
national economic performance to satisfy the convergence criteria. This
inquiry re-examines the existing comprehensive, generous social welfare
systems. These programs form the basis of Europe's modern culture of
social cohesion and provide a broad social safety net. The safety net
includes disability, survivor (death), health, work injury, unemployment,
and family benefits (children benefits). 15 3 In general, the benefits are man-
dated by national legislation and provide higher levels of assistance for a
longer period of time than those provided in the United States. No corre-
sponding benefit exists in the United States regarding family allowance,
state-provided maternity health care, and the requirements for lengthy,
fully-paid maternity leave time. Member State employment-related benefits
volatility could recede even further as the 15 nations of the European Union move
toward the creation of a common currency by 1999." Id. at D6.
149. See Fine & Alland, supra note 45, at 284-85.
150. According to European Community goals, the common currency will facilitate
genuine price comparisons for goods and services within the union, thus stimulating
competition and trade. The coordination by the central bank should promote price sta-
bility and lowered public deficits - all resulting in economic growth, additional invest-
ment, and savings. See ECONOMIC AND MoNErARY UNION, supra note 110, at 13. For
further discussion of the benefits of monetary union, see Robert Inman & Daniel
Rubinfield, The EMU and Fiscal Policy in the New European Community: An Issue For
Economic Federalism, 14 INT'L Rev. L. & EcoN. 147, 148-49 (1994).
151. See id. at 30.
152. Wanda Menke-Glickert, Kohl's Goals, EUROPE, Mar. 1997, at 18.
153. See U.S. SocIAL SEcutwry ADMINISTRATON, supra note 53, at v-xxxv (includes
detailed descriptions of most countries' social welfare programs). See also EC SocIAL
PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 13-23 (alphabetically listing each country's system and
providing specific, detailed explanation of benefit reforms).
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generally require both employer and employee funding or contribution,
with varying levels of government subsidy.'
5 4
A. Germany
Even Germany, Europe's industrial and financial powerhouse, must
demonstrate its economic fitness to qualify for the convergence criteria.
Germany faces a budget gap between DM 25 to DM 27 billion.' 55 Chronic
unemployment and the cost of re-unification have taken their toll on the
German economy.' 5 6 Overall economic sluggishness has also contributed
to the budget gap.157 Germany's legal structure and restrictive work rules
burden productivity, with German workers receiving the highest wages, the
shortest working hours, and the longest vacations of all workers in
Europe.158 The 1996 German national debt rose to $1.33 trillion, equal to
61% of GDP. i59 In the face of such alarming numbers, German leaders
will find it difficult to correct budget imbalances and market inefficiencies.
The distasteful corrective measures might further impede economic
reform. While budget discipline will entail pruning a majority of the fed-
eral departmental budgets, proposals to reduce social welfare benefits raise
widespread public concern.16
0
Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl initiated efforts at fiscal improvement
in the early 1990s, though not through an organized or comprehensive pro-
154. See generally U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53 (describing the
descriptions of each country's level of benefits and funding sources). For example, Aus-
trian law requires full salary maternity benefits for eight weeks before and after child
birth, paid from a small tax (approximately 3.75%) on wage earners and employers. See
id. at 21-22.
155. For a detailed examination of the criteria for all EU countries in 1997, see
Kenen, supra note 143, at 8-12. See also European Union/Budget, Money, Banking Special
No. 4453 (visited Dec. 10, 1997) <imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/weolO97/weocon97.
htm> (estimating the 1997 budget gap at DM 25 billion); John Schmid, Bonn Takes Aim
at Tax Breaks; Industry Objects to Waigel's Latest Budget Proposal, Iwr'L HERALD TRIB.,June
21, 1997, at 11. (estimates 1997 DM 27 billion budget gap). Germany maintains an
excessive deficit (over 3%) and public debt (over 60% GDP). Kicking and Screaming,
supra note 18, at 19.
156. See Cowell, supra note 14, at A4. The welfare crisis in Germany is largely the
result of two factors unrelated to social welfare, namely the phenomenon of high unem-
ployment and the financing of re-unification. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 4.
157. See INTERNATINAL MONETARY FuND, supra note 7, at 3 (setting out four major fac-
tors for "exceptional sluggishness").
158. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 7. See also Dowling, supra note 51, at 45
(describing how high employment costs and restrictive employment regulations impose
significant production burdens). The OECD and the EMI broadly recommend easing
employment protection legislation, reducing taxes on labor costs, tightening retirement
and disability schemes, and restricting unemployment insurance systems across Europe
to improve employment and related economic problems. See OECD, supra note 83, at
15-21 (illustrating country-by-country recommendations for these reforms); EUROPEAN
MONETARY INSTUTEr, supra note 7, at 2-3.
159. See Menke-Gluckert, supra note 152, at 18.
160. The federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is the largest recipient in the
1997 budget, exceeding DM 120 billion. This contrasts with a defense budget of DM 46
billion and transport budget of DM 45 billion. See European Union/Budget, Money,
Banking Special, supra note 155.
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gram.161 With German reunification achieved, economic reform efforts
gained momentum in the mid-1990s. As economic events unfolded, Kohl
campaigned extensively for further restructuring of Germany's "vaunted
and well-padded [social] welfare state."162 Germany warned its citizens
what many experts had already concluded: in a global economy, the rules
of business have changed and expansive, expensive welfare states do not
compete well. Kohl concluded that the present state of affairs "demands
that people adjust and lower expectations."'163 He argues against maintain-
ing the present welfare state because a third of Germany's GDP is spent on
welfare programs. He advocated focusing benefits on the truly needy and
carrying out reforms essential for creating jobs.164 The Social Democrats
and the labor unions fought the changes as expected.' 65 For years, Ger-
many's powerful labor unions have protested against social cuts, but with
unemployment so high, the economic and political context indicates that
reforms engendering more efficiency and competitiveness have become
inevitable. The fact that many German manufacturers are relocating pro-
duction to avoid the "high labor costs and rigid union rules signals the
need for welfare and labor reform."' 66
Over the past six years, the German government has enacted and
implemented substantial budget cuts, particularly in the area of social
insurance.167 The list of reform laws include: the Law on Securing and
Improving the Structure of the National Health Insurance (GSG) of 1992,
the 1992 Pension Reform, the 1994 Law on Long-term Care Insurance, the
Law Revising Parental Allowances of 1996, the First and Second Health
System Restructuring Laws of 1996 and 1997, the Reform Law on Unem-
ployment Assistance of 1996, the First Law on Changing Services and Ben-
efits for Asylum Applicants of 1996, and the Law Reforming Rights to
161. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 1. Kohl's Christian Democrats and their junior
coalition partner, the Free Democrats, have worked together to enact reforms since
1992. See id. at 19.
162. Cowell, supra note 14, at Al. For a detailed description of Germany's compre-
hensive social protection program, the current efforts at restricting expenditures and
entitlements, and the resulting heavy criticism, see Mushaben, supra note 49, at 19-24.
See generally U.S. SociAL SEcuRITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at xx-xxvi; EC SocL _
PROTECTON, supra note 22, at 13-23. The German welfare state is a "Bismarckian" -type,
with employment-based financing (as opposed to full general funding by the state).
Employers and employees contribute to the general scheme, and the government subsi-
dizes it from general tax revenues. In 1994, the funding was allocated at the following
rates: employers paid 36.2%, employees paid 21%, and the central government paid
30%. See Karl Hinrichs, The Impact of German Health Insurance Reforms on Redistribu-
tion and the Culture of Solidarity, 20J. HEALTH POL., PoI'Y & L. 653, 659 (1995).
163. Alan Cowell, Small Business Bears Brunt of German Taxes, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Aug. 2-3, 1997, at 1.
164. Press and Information Office of the German Government, Address Given by
Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the General Meeting of the German Magazine Publishers' Associ-
ation (visited Nov. 19, 1997) <http://www.bundesregierung.de:80/pweb7>.
165. See Dowling, supra note 51, at 45.
166. JoelJanssen, Privatizations, Hopes and Headaches, EuROPE, Nov., 1997, at 43.
167. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 4. See also EC SoCIAL PROTECnON, supra note
22, at 29.
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Social Assistance of 1996.168 These laws included a host of substantive
changes in the qualifications, funding, and benefits associated with the
social provisions. For example, the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social
Order reduced expenditures for social spending - including pension,
health care, and other benefits programs - by DM 10 billion between 1995
and 1996.169 Finally, German representatives introduced ancillary legisla-
tion that would relax labor laws to stimulate employment. The OECD
reports German advancement toward streamlined economic effectiveness
and increased competitiveness.
170
In 1996, the German government adopted a comprehensive 50 Point
Action Program for Investment and Jobs, later developed in the Increased
Growth and Employment Program. 17 1 The programs target reduced gov-
ernment spending to pre-unification figures, and increased investment and
job creation, while reducing taxes, wage costs, and labor restrictions. In
April 1996, Kohl and his coalition partners 172 instituted the 1997
Sparpaket (literally meaning "savings" or "economizing package"), which
implemented the Growth and Employment Program. The Program called
for measures to decrease unemployment benefits, raise the retirement age
for everyone to sixty-five by the year 2001, postpone the scheduled 10%
increase in the family child allowance, reduce government-required sick
pay from 100% to 80% in the first six weeks, allow less time in state-spon-
sored recuperative treatments in health spas, and permit short-term dismis-
sals in small companies. 17 3 When political negotiations with the Social
Democrats who strongly opposed the legislation faltered, the entire process
broke down.
168. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 4-5.
169. See id. at 5-6. Previous reforms in social welfare produced DM 9 billion in
reduced expenditures, but these were not maintained as loopholes emerged and some
regulations were relaxed. See id. at 6. Reform of the statutory health care insurance
system gained prominence in the 1990s. Hinrichs, supra note 162, at 663. Medical
services funding and long-term disability wage replacement represent the second largest
component of the German welfare program. See id. at 665. For a description of the
1000 plus insurance funds through which these welfare programs are funded, see id.
Reform efforts in 1989 failed to curb rising costs, and renewed efforts began in 1992. In
1993 successful reforms took effect, bringing cost containment and organizational fund
reform. See id. at 671. Benefits were frozen at 1991 levels and doctors and pharmacies
faced limits on services and prices. Patient co-payments were also increased. Signifi-
cantly, the funds were cross-subsidized in order to balance risk differentials and contri-
bution levels were harmonized. See id. at 672.
170. See OECD, supra note 83, at 8. The Report praises raising the retirement age,
reducing red tape for business start-ups, and exempting small companies from employ-
ment protection programs. The Report also criticizes some reforms that affect only mar-
ginal sectors, such as the part-time work-force in small firms and businesses who engage
in short-term contracts. See id. at 8.
171. See Program for Increased Growth and Employment, at 1 (last visitedJan. 1, 1998)
<http://bundesregierung.de/ausland/news/reports/growth.html>.
172. The coalition consists of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian
Social Union (CSU), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).
173. See Menke-Gluckert, supra note 152, at 18. These measures represent the most
recent round of saving packages. The 1994 Sparpaket originally introduced the cuts
followed by further packages in 1996 and 1997. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 7.
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In a March 1997 speech, Kohl elaborated on the 50 Point Action Pro-
gram, designed to make Germany more attractive to industry and reduce
unemployment. 174 Kohl designed the plan to further reduce government-
mandated benefits to workers. Specifically, the new legislation lengthens
the average number of working hours allowed per work day; eliminates the
burdensome dismissal protection regulations to businesses with fewer than
ten employees, allowing small and medium-sized businesses to hire new
workers more efficiently; facilitates the employment of workers on an
independent contractor basis; and allows companies to negotiate for
smaller sick pay obligations to workers. 175 Numerous small adjustments,
such as adding a one-month qualifying period before continued pay provi-
sions take effect, and omitting overtime wages from the calculation of holi-
day pay, will help ease the cost burden.1 76 Kohl also promised to continue
reform of the pension and health care systems. This reform required a
brake on annual pension hikes and a new basis for disability status, includ-
ing health factors independent of extraneous job market considerations. 
177
Kohl also emphasized that reducing government expenditure would result
in lower subsidies to industry.
178
Funding worker pensions has imposed a heavy burden on the budget.
With decreasing birth rates and increasing life expectancies, fewer workers
fund the benefits while the sums needed for retirement are raised. "As the
proportion of citizens aged 65 or older increases significantly (24% in
1995 and predicted to exceed 30% by the year 2010), the divergent
demographics and economic costs" will produce a huge economic
problem.
17 9
By all accounts, Germany is groaning under the strain of high labor costs,
lavish vacation and sick pay benefits, and rigid work rules. Employees are
entitled by law to six weeks of vacation, plus frequent religious holidays, and
union contracts in many industries entitle workers to extra money for vaca-
tion and a month's bonus at Christmas.
1 80
Employee sick pay is one of the most generous in Europe - 100% for six
weeks. The new law decreases sick pay to eighty percent. Social benefits
174. See Press and Information Office of the German Government, Setting the Course
for Germany (visited Mar. 12, 1997) ,http://www.bundesregierung.de:80/pweb7>.
175. See id. In addition, Kohl praised the privatization of the federal railway and
postal service, and Deutsche Telecom's initial public offering of stock.
176. See Program for Increased Growth and Employment, supra note 171, at 5.
177. See id. at 2-3.
In view of the dramatic changes taking place in our society today, I feel that a
just balance of burdens between young and old in the name of solidarity is abso-
lutely vital. Investors need a reliable signal that pension insurance contributions
will be reduced and stabilized so that statutory nonwage labor costs can fall.
Id. at 3.
178. Present subsidies of DM 10 billion would be reduced to DM 3.8 billion. See id.
at 5.
179. Joyce Mane Mushaben, Restructuring the German Sozialstaat: Internal and Exter-
nal Forces for Change 8 (unpublished paper prepared for the 1997 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association) (on file with author).
180. Cowell, supra note 14, at 3.
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and vacation pay add eighty percent to basic wages, and the restrictive
work rules inhibit the creation of new jobs.18' Consequently, it costs
approximately $55,000 to lay off one worker.182 A 1996 study revealed
that the social welfare costs associated with employee benefits significantly
hinder small and medium-sized businesses in the EU from competing and
expanding in today's competitive global markets. 183 To alleviate the
problems, the Conservative government hopes to reduce non-wage costs of
labor to below forty percent.'
84
Pension reform in 1997, similar to its precursor in 1992, will decrease
retirement entitlements by referencing them to net rather than gross wages.
Most workers will see a six percent decrease (from seventy to sixty-four
percent) in their former gross income. 185 SinceJuly 1997, 1.8 million civil
servants have had their retirement age raised to sixty-three. Moreover, the
reform discounts contain training periods with respect to qualification
years for retirement benefits. The reform also places certain limitations on
supplementary earnings, part-time work, and benefits for "political bureau-
crats."' 8 6 These changes in retirement vesting rules will surely arouse
deep concern among workers.
Additional reforms occurred with respect to social insurance pro-
grams. In 1995, required contributions to social insurance programs were
increased via a surcharge on health and pension premiums.'8 7
The reforms also affected job security. Prior to 1996, the
Kundigungsschutz protected workers from termination in firms with ten
full-time or twenty part-time employees. With the enactment of the 1996
law that exempted mid-sized businesses from the Kundigungsschutz, eight
million workers enjoyed less job security. Germany also made changes to
employee healthcare benefits. Beginning in 1997, the government allowed
participants in major health funds to choose from competing funds, thus
increasing competition.' 88 Other 1997 reforms included raising co-pay-
ments for medical services such as prescriptions and levying surcharges on
Krankenkasse (health insurance) members to finance hospital
renovations. 189
Additionally, Germany capped expenditures for health cards at DM
181. See Barnard, supra note 15, at 16.
182. See id. at 17.
183. Europe Information Service, Excessive Charges for SMEs Pose Short-Term Threat
to Employment, EUROPEAN SoCIAL PoLIcy, Apr. 12, 1996, at 1.
184. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 6.
185. See id. at 6. See also EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 29.
186. Mushaben, supra note 49, at 10. Education or training years earned prior to age
17 will no longer count toward vesting pensions, and a maximum of educational vesting
years is set at three. Also, the assessment basis for pensions will not exceed 75% of
average remuneration. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 29.
187. See EC Social PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 29; Mushaben, supra note 49, at 6.
188. See EC SoCIAL PROTECrION, supra note 22, at 29; Mushaben, supra note 49, at 6.
These private health insurance funds were previously available only to those in the
higher income brackets.
189. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 7.
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1.8 billion below the 1995 budget allotment for this benefit.' 90 Dental
insurance has largely privatized, and sick pay was reduced substantially:
twenty percent in short-term illness and ten percent in long-term bene-
fits.19 1 The Growth Program also contains several new changes to the tax
laws designed to stimulate job growth and investment, such as incentives
for the start-up of small and medium-sized businesses and the reduction of
many taxes.
192
To make the economy more flexible, the 1996 law changed a long-
standing European tradition - businesses and shops may now stay open
for business after 6:30 p.m. on weekdays, as well as Saturday afternoons.
Hence, the march to market flexibility and the single currency caused cul-
tural, as well as economic, adaptations. Aside from changes implemented
by the government, the private sector is also taking steps to adapt to the
changing economy, further affecting worker pay and government support.
Considered the model of industry from the 1960s through the 1980s,
German companies became less efficient and more generous to workers
over the years. In an effort to make their companies more competitive,
some private corporations enacted unexpected budget cuts. Additionally,
three major German corporations recently attempted to take advantage of
the new law that reduced the legally required minimum employer sick pay
from 100% to eighty percent. These three corporations unilaterally cut
sick pay by twenty percent, even though labor contracts presently in force
covered the workers. While the companies backed away from the drastic
cut after the union and employees protested, 193 the attempt reflects the
aggressiveness of the new market environment. This trend is certain to
continue in response to rising global competition created by the opening of
the Eastern European markets, the success of the European Union, the cre-
ations of the World Trade Organization, and the emerging industries in
Asia.
Privatization also served as an effective tool in Germany. For exam-
ple, the government sold its stake in Lufthansa, a major international air
carrier, netting $2.8 billion for the state budget.194 Furthermore, priva-
tization freed some enterprises from the government's often costly and
inefficient management.
Germany has undertaken an overall campaign for efficiency and com-
petitiveness, as evidenced by the general tightening of the requirements for
social assistance and benefits, and moves toward streamlined business
rules and privatization. One political scientist complained that the trend is
moving away from social benevolence: "[t]hough German TURBO-CAPI-
TALISM (Der Speigel) is still many degrees removed from its American
KILLER CAPITALISM (Newsweek) equivalent, it is hardly moving towards
190. See EC SOCIAL PROTaCTION, supra note 22, at 29.
191. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 7.
192. See Program For Increased Growth and Employment, supra note 171, at 1.
193. See Cowell, supra note 163, at 4. One company noted that it would save DM 76
million a year by cutting sick benefits to 80% (approximately $50 million). See id.
194. See Ester Lawshway, Newsmakers, EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 45.
Cornell International Law Journal
the CARING CAPITALISM of Ben & Jerry's."'195 She concluded that an
economic system whose only goal is to promote the free flow of commerce
threatens Germany's traditional social partnership, its custom of consen-




To reduce its budget deficit and comply with the convergence criteria,
"Austria recently adopted a far-reaching set of reforms," including major
structural reforms in social protection programs. 19 7 In 1996, Austria con-
ducted extensive legislative cuts to reduce employment and health benefits,
ease job restrictions, tighten entitlement requirements, and trim the tradi-
tionally generous social benefits to families and students. 198
The 1996 Sparpaket implemented numerous reductions in social pro-
tection programs, including pension reforms. In 1997, the new rules
required an additional two and a half years in vesting time for early retire-
ment, from 420 months (thirty-five years of actual work) to 450.199 Simi-
larly, the rules extended the required insurance period for early retirement
through the unemployment system, requiring an additional five years of
qualified work (twenty years with insurance, rather than the previous fif-
teen) before the unemployed applicant can qualify. Finally, the legislature
raised the vesting age for early retirement of men with reduced capacity to
work to fifty-seven, but left the vesting age for women unchanged at fifty-
five. This increased the vesting time period for men by five years. 200 The
new rules restricted disability pensions as well and placed new emphasis
on rehabilitation. Limited to a maximum term of two years, the benefit is
available only when rehabilitation proves impossible, and work is limited
while receiving the pension. Furthermore, a new model for calculating
pension sums favors longer contribution periods, which encourages later
entry into retirement. Finally, the rules reduced the "over-proportional fed-
195. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 19.
196. See id. at 20-22. Significant growth in the foreign population of Germany (from
1.2% in 1960 to almost 9% in 1997) also raises numerous questions about commitment
to social solidarity. See Alan Cowell, Like It or Not, Germany Becomes a Melting Pot, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, at 3.
197. EC SOCIAL PROTECTON, supra note 22, at 13, 14, 46-48.
198. See id. The author wishes to thank Dr. Roland Winkler of the University of Salz-
burg, as well as Mag. Dagmar Schelle and Mag. Verena Haas, both of Vienna, for assist-
ance with the Austrian budget modifications. For full description of the comprehensive
social welfare program in Austria, see U.S. SocIAL SEcuary ADMINISTRATON, supra note
53, at 21-23, and EC SocIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, (alphabetically listing each
country's system with specific, detailed explanations of benefits).
199. See EC SOCIAL PROTECnON, supra note 22, at 46. The whole pension system con-
tinued under reform negotiations in 1997. A compromise bill subsequently passed the
Nationalrat (the first house of Parliament) and is awaiting passage in the upper house.
The bill, "1. Budgetbegleitgesetz 1997" (first additional law to the 1997 budget), would
harmonize the several retirement systems (employees, workers, civil servants, entrepre-
neurs), including the harmonization and reduction of civil servants benefits.
200. See id. Also, the qualifying time for retirement benefits no longer automatically
includes time spent at school or at a university.
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eral grant," which once helped fund the pensions for farmers and the self-
employed, and raised the contributions by the insured.
201
Reforms also made unemployment benefits more difficult to obtain
and reduced the amount allotted to the unemployed. 20 2 The reforms
doubled the required assessment period for this benefit from six to twelve
months. Now, only those who are available for work can obtain unemploy-
ment benefits. Furthermore, the rules increased the sanctions for those
who refuse to work. The unemployment-reduction scheme encouraged the
creation of a special system to stimulate the employment of older workers
(Bonus-Malus-System). Under this system, employers who hire workers
between ages fifty and fifty-five pay only half of the usual required unem-
ployment contributions, and none at all when hiring workers over fifty-five.
In addition, penalty contributions apply when an employer dismisses an
employee in these age groups, provided that the company employs the
employee for ten years or more.
203
The legislature extensively reformed hospital and sickness benefit pro-
visions.20 4 Since July 1, 1996, the health insurance branch of social secur-
ity fully paid for cures and rehabilitation programs (e.g., for recoveries after
heart attacks or other serious illnesses) in special hotels, spas, or hospitals.
The new rules now require a daily contribution of 70 to 180 Schillings for
cures (several levels according to social position) and 70 Schillings for
rehabilitation.
The rules particularly affected social benefits relating to the family.
For example, the legislature gradually reduced the traditional government
financial contribution to each family upon the birth of a child (known in
Austria as the Geburtenbeihilfe) from 15,000 Shillings to zero. 205 The leg-
islature also abolished a related social benefit, the Mother-Child Pass (Mut-
ter-Kind Pass), which once allowed children free access to medical care and
served as a motivation for parents to seek medical care for their children.
The program required parents to attend to and document the regular medi-
cal needs of their child, such as vaccinations and check-ups. Without the
requisite doctor's signature to demonstrate the scheduled care, the finan-
cial grant has discontinued. When the rules abolished the overall benefit,
the leverage and subsequent impetus for good child care also disappeared.
Similarly, the legislature modified the Karenzgeld financial benefit,
which allowed parents of newborns to take time off from work and
reflected an interesting attempt to encourage fathers to spend time with the
their children. The rules reduced benefits from two years leave per parent
to two years per couple and induced one parent to spend at least six
201. Id.
202. See id. at 47. Article 23 of the law provided extensive details primarily designed
to avoid abuse of the system.
203. See id.
204. See EC SocLa. PRoTEcIoN, supra note 22, at 48.
205. See id. at 47. In December 1997, $1 exchanged for approximately 11 Austrian
Schillings. $1 Equals .... N.Y. TiwEs, Dec. 28, 1997, at C2 (chart).
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months with the newborn.20 6 Furthermore, the rules restricted the family
allowance for children by limiting the allowance to children age twenty-six
or younger, rather than the previous twenty-seven.
207
The legislature restricted student benefits. Textbooks for school are
no longer completely free of charge, and the rules modified the
Familienbeihilfe, a monthly benefit paid to parents for each child in school.
The changes provide for termination of benefits if the student (over age
nineteen) fails twice in school or takes two or more semesters beyond the
required minimum time in which to complete their studies. 208 In addition,
the rules discontinued free transportation for university students on trams,
subways, and buses during the academic year.
20 9
Civil servants and teachers received no raise in monthly wages in
1996 and 1997. Instead, the legislature allotted only a small, one-time
additional payment. The legislature also discontinued the customary "jubi-
lee extra pay" (what teachers with thirty-five years of service receive upon
retirement), except for those over sixty years old. The new rules cut civil
service early retirement benefits, and the general retirement benefit was
reduced because of several new methods of calculating the pension.
Tax reform also decreased benefits. For example, the reforms cur-
tailed the "Sonderausgaben" (an important tax deduction) for people who
earn more than 500,000 Schillings per year and eliminated it for those
making over 700,000 annually. This tax provision allowed deductions for
certain expenditures, including life insurance and home construction.
This deduction was particularly significant because it could move the tax-
payer into a lower taxation level.
The legislature made efforts to increase taxes on workers' monthly
wages above the regular twelve monthly payments. In Austria, workers
receive two or more extra monthly payments in addition to the twelve cal-
endar months. These extra payments are taxed at lower rates. The
employer must transfer the mandatory social security tax for Werkver-
traege (independent work contracts) to reduce social security tax.210 Many
consider this a deep-seated reform due to the growth of atypical employ-
ment relationships. 211
The legislature reduced the Allgemeine Absetzbetrag (standard per
person annual deduction) for people who earn more than 200,000 Schil-
lings per year and abolished it for those earning 500,000 Schillings or
more. Certain business deductions were also reduced. The Betriebsaus-
gaben (business expenses, such as computers, office machinery, paper)
206. The parents could share equally, with each taking one year. This enactment
applies to parents of babies born after July 1, 1996. See EC Soclu. PROTECTION, supra
note 22, at 3, 47.
207. See id. Many young people in Europe remain enrolled in college for longer peri-
ods than their U.S. counterparts and can qualify for this family benefit.
208. The rule began on October 1, 1996. See id.
209. The rules took effect on September 1, 1996. See id.
210. See EC SoCAIL PROTECTON, supra note 22, at 48 (discussing popularity of pro-




lump sum deduction, known as the Pauschale, was reduced from twelve
percent to six percent of the turnover. Thus, a wide range of reforms have
imposed restrictions on social spending in Austria.
In addition, the legislature raised the inheritance and gift tax for real
estate. Short-term life insurance lost favorable tax treatment, and the over-
all tax on capital gains (Kapitalertragssteuer) increased from twenty-two
percent to twenty-five percent. Taxes on utility consumption (electricity
and gas) and on cigarettes were raised. The government imposed an inter-
esting new tax (Blaulichtsteuer - "Blue light cost") on anyone who calls
the police to a traffic accident without personal injury - 500 Schillings.
C. France
France's new Socialist finance minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, predicts
that France will satisfy the "dreaded euro-qualifying target" of a public sec-
tor deficit under three percent of GDP in time for entry into monetary
union.212 The new Socialist government, he asserts, will achieve this fiscal
improvement while keeping its campaign promises: to hold both spending
and taxes down; to give more money to education, culture, and the courts;
and to create jobs. 213 This painless transition seems exaggerated in light of
the troubled economic and political struggle to satisfy the criteria over the
past three years.
In 1997, voter disapproval of the economy and budget policies pur-
sued to attain the convergence criteria forced the center-right coalition gov-
ernment out of office. 214 Over the past four years, the tax burden in
France increased to a record forty-six percent of GDP in 1997,215 with
unemployment at 12.8%.216 The tax and rigid labor regulation system
cried out for reform with public spending amounting to fifty-four percent
of GDP. 2 17 President Chirac proposed "a brutal new dose of austerity"2 18
212. France's Budget: Circle Squared?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 27, 1997, at 53.
213. See id.
214. A "minefield of budget cuts... blasted... Jupp6 out of the prime Minister's
job .. " Marlise Simons, Child Care Sacred as France Cuts Back the Welfare State, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1997, at A8.
215. See France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54. Since 1991, France
had introduced two new taxes (Contribution Sociale Generalisde and Remboursement de
la Dette Sociale) on a broader than payroll basis, including income from business and
investment, earmarked to help pay for the family allowance and to service pension
funds. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 14, n.11.
216. See Crossed Fingers in France, [hereinafter Crossed Fingers] ECONOMIST, Apr. 26,
1997, at 45-46. The 12.8% represents a post 1945 high. See Pas de Blair, ECONOMIST,
May 10, 1997, at 46. See also OECD, supra note 83, at 9, for comprehensive French
economic data.
217. See Crossed Fingers, supra note 216, at 45-46. The tax burden and public spend-
ing reached record highs in the last two years of the center-right coalition. See Pas de
Blair, supra note 216, at 46. By 1994, social welfare spending totaled $463 billion,
31.4% of GDP, higher than in Germany or Italy. See Social Protection and Unemployment
Benefits, at 1 (last visitedJan. 1, 1998) <http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/france/societe/
protsoc.gb.html>. Fundamental labor market reforms are considered essential to restore
economic performance. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 5.
218. Id. For a description of social protection in France, see EC SOCIAL PROTECTION,
supra note 22, at 13-23 (alphabetically listing each country's system with a detailed
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and then issued a surprise call for new elections in May 1997 (ten months
ahead of time), hoping to gain voter approval of the Conservative govern-
ment's approach to the budget process.2 19 The tactic exploded into a
shocking rejection of the government and the creation of the new Socialist
coalition.
2 20
Chirac's conservative government froze budgets at 1996 levels and
proposed sweeping changes in the national health care system as a key
governmental tool for cutting spending.2 2 1 The French health care system
offered generous, if not lavish, benefits when viewed in comparison to pres-
ent U.S. practices of managed health care. In France, it has "been consid-
ered the universal right of French citizens to unlimited health care, with
practically no questions asked of doctors or patients." 22 2 Other austerity
efforts initiated reforms of the defense industry, the university and judicial
systems, and even the railways.22 3 When the government threatened fur-
ther stern measures, the public again became restive. The Socialists cam-
paigned on the theme of the social cuts' brutality and expressed grave
reservations about the convergence criteria for France's entry into the mon-
etary union.2 24 Promising a different direction from the Conservatives,
Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin pledged to create 700,000 new jobs for
the young, raise the minimum wage and increase pensions, boost cultural
and education spending, and cut the work week without pay reductions. 225
The voter rejection of the Conservative tack resulted in the appointment of
Socialist Prime Minster Lionel Jospin and the awkward process of govern-
ment by cohabitation.
explanation of benefits), and U.S. SOCIAL SEcuRrrY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at
130-33.
219. Party loyalty was weak, as many Conservatives in Parliament were unwilling to
vote for "harsh reforms and vicious spending cuts." Crossed Fingers, supra note 216, at
45.
220. See Kicking and Screaming, supra note 18, at 19. That governments should limit
public expenditure (for vital social purposes) to balance budgets is an alien, incompre-
hensible concept to some French. See Paul Spicker, Exclusion, 35 J. COMMON MK-r. STUD.
134, 141 (Mar. 1997).
221. Restrictive measures, including target ceilings on health benefits, were intended
to reduce the deficits in the pension and health insurance budgets through the use of
computer tracking of patient costs, with penalization of doctors who surpass budget
limits. See Whitney, The More Things Change, supra note 56, at 4-5. See also Craig R.
Whitney, In France, Socialized Medicine Meets Gallic Version of H.M.O., N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
25, 1996, at A5.
222. Id.
223. See Crossed Fingers, supra note 216, at 46.
224. See id. In a reversal of roles, the Socialists, who originally favored the single
currency, proposed conditions before France should proceed further: no new austerity
cuts, establishment of an European "economic government" to counterbalance the ECB,
restraint on the valuation of the euro, a solidarity and growth pact, and the inclusion of
Italy and Spain in the first wave. See Pas de Blair, supra note 216, at 45. EU legendary
leader Jacques Delors, former Commission president and one of the inventors of the
single currency, advises the Socialist government on monetary union. See Kicking and
Screaming, supra note 18, at 20.
225. All of these promises are to be accomplished without raising the budget deficit or
raising taxes. See France Still Trapped, ECONOMIST, July 5, 1997, at 51. See also France:
Politics Meets Mathematics, supra note 76, at 52.
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The clash between a new free-market Europe and a bloated welfare
state sharpened with Rightists advocating some form of the American
model, and Socialists defending the state's central role in the economy.
22 6
For many, the euro became synonymous with fiscal austerity.227 While
"getting into the first round of the euro union"228 has a nice ring to it,
getting there is not without some painful retraction.
Public protest and disapproval, often disruptive and confrontational,
has proven pandemic in France. Annual strikes by numerous groups
caused enormous upheaval in business and politics, and "pushed social
issues to the forefront."229 Government attempts at fiscal discipline, such
as reigning in growing French deficits by reducing pensions and other ben-
efits, prompted countless public protests and job actions. In the winter of
1995, a month long transportation strike virtually paralyzed the coun-
try.230 Yielding to political pressure, the government withdrew plans for
pension and health care reform, along with plans to reduce the budgets for
the national rail system.
Workers struck again in November 1996. The resolution of this twelve
day trucker's strike evidences the difficulty of the French experience.
Despite urgent need to reduce government spending, the widespread pub-
lic support for the strike forced the Government to capitulate again to
union demands. The truck drivers successfully negotiated an award of a
special $500 bonus for the drivers as well as reductions in the retirement
age and the number of work hours.231 These enhanced employment bene-
fits and salary increases dearly conflicted with the Government's unques-
tioned fiscal need to reduce costs and increase competitiveness.
The scenario repeated itself again in November 1997, when truckers
erected 150 barricades all over France blocking most inter-city trans-
226. See Thomas L. Friedman, All About Maggie, N.Y. TIMEs, May 5, 1997, at A15.
Consider the contrast between French equality and American liberty. See Roger Cohen,
France v. U.S.: Warring Versions of Capitalism, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 20, 1997, at A10.
France has vastly better public medicine than America, safer cities, higher mini-
mum wages, less crime and more job security, particularly in its huge public
sector. But it also has a 12.6 [%] unemployment rate that is more than double
the American [rate], much higher taxes, a long-stagnant economy, crippling
social security charges that discourages hiring. . ., and a debilitating anxiety
about change that has held back its investment in new technologies.
Id.
227. -See Cohen, supra note 226, at A10.
228. Celestine Bohlen, Seeking Euro Club Inclusion, Italy Still Faces Hazing, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 1997, at A12.
229. EC SocAL PRoTEcrnoN, supra note 22, at 33. See Craig R. Whitney, French Truck-
ers', supra note 56, at A4. Civil servants of many varieties - from doctors and teachers
to social security workers and transit drivers - have conducted strikes or protests. See,
e.g., Manifestation de la FSU pour le budget de l'education, LE MONDE, June 4, 1996, at 13;
Securite Sociale: plusieurs milliers d'agents de la Securite sociale ont manifeste pour
reclamer des augmentations de salaires et la maintien du pouvoird'achat, LE MONDE, Feb.
22, 1997, at 8.
230. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
231. See Whitney, French Truckers', supra note 56, at A4.
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port.232 These blockades prevented transit of trucks around most of West-
ern Europe, and the new Socialist-led Government faced pressure from
other EU countries to open the roads for commerce. 233 The French gov-
ernment's refusal to open the roads represented a "clear cut collision
between Europe and l'exception francais - the widespread conviction here
that France can enter the new millennium with its idiosyncracies and
resistance to change intact."234 Paradoxically, this new Government rose
to power, at least partially, on the wave of protest and unrest caused by
previous strikes, and Socialist leaders had promised to support workers in
getting the benefits of their prior bargaining. 235 Taking the soft approach
discussed above, the parties resolved the strike after a few days with mini-
mal damage to the national economy. Nonetheless, the government still
faces the basic dilemma of governing in the single currency transition
period, while trying to solve the French puzzle of chronic unemployment
and soaring public debt.
Thus far, the French have implemented only modest reforms. The gov-
ernment amended the constitution to allow Parliament to set general finan-
cial parameters for social security expenditures. The relationship between
the Government and social security institutions has been modified to con-
clude multi-annual agreements regarding expenditures and standards of
service.236 More direct measures to raise income and reduce outlays
include: reductions in the defense budget, a temporary surcharge of FFr
18 billion on company profits, and reductions in some social benefits,
including the traditional family allowance.237 Other measures include an
increase in the contribution rate for health insurance on replacement
income, an increase in the flat hospital copayment to FFr 70, limits on the
maternity benefit, as well as broadening the tax base to include investment,
property-related and other sources of income.238 In 1996, the legislature
232. See id. Another estimated 160 barricades blockaded oil refineries and fuel
depots, forcing 40% of French gas stations to close or restrict supplies. See BarryJames,
Trucker Talks Yield Progress; French Strikers Win Many Demands but Stay Out, Iwr'L HER.
ALD TRIB., Nov. 7, 1997, at 1.
233. See James, supra note 232, at 1.
234. John Vincour, French Strike Hardening; International Pressure Grows on Paris to
Act, Iwr' HERALD TRIB., Nov. 5, 1997, at 1. The EU neighbors - Spain, Britain, and
Germany - as well as the European Commission, insisted that the French government
must "begin making policy in a frame of reference going beyond that eternal push-and-
pull of national doctrine and politics." Their irritation arose from "the French govern-
ment's seeming lack of resolve in maintaining freedom of movement of people and
goods across the country, a prime tenet of the European Union." Id. at 1, 10.
235. See id. Trucker union leaders insisted that some of the employer associations
had failed to live up to the agreements reached after the 1996 strikes, such as the work
hour reductions and bonuses. See Whitney, French Truckers, supra note 56, at A4.
236. See EC SOCIAL PRoTEcnON, supra note 22, at 22, 33-37. Articles 34 and 39 of the
constitution were amended and a new article 47-1 was added granting Parliament this
power.
237. See France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54. The French have,
however, raised child-care funding, considering it increasingly important as more
mothers work. See Simons, supra note 214, at Al, A8.
238. See EC SociAl PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 34 (ordinance of January 24, 1996,
concerning the repayment of the social debt).
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enacted a new tax on employer contributions and personnel representation
bodies to support the Old Age Solidarity Fund, and introduced a new
indemnity concept to require third parties responsible for accidents to con-
tribute to the related social security costs. 23 9 Many on the Left are pleased,
as Jospin's revenue-generating plans focus more on the wealthy. The rules
subject large firms with annual sales of FFr 50 million or more to the
surcharge and temporarily raise both the corporate and capital gains tax
rates from 36.6% to 41.6%.240 The OECD, however, concludes that the
reforms have been "measured and incremental," rather than the broad
approach needed to prompt substantial economic recovery.2 4 1 The OECD
report approves the new incentives to encourage part-time work, tightened
early retirement regulations, eased restrictions on unusual working hours,
lowered tax rates on lower income workers, and a shift away from payroll
taxes as revenue sources, but criticizes increased benefits for employment
protection and new measures to discourage overtime work.
242
France spends more on its family policy than any other European
country, devoting 3.5% of GDP toward funding various family benefits.
These benefits include a grant for birth of the first child, an allowance for
mothers remaining in the home to raise the child, school allowance, and
certain fiscal advantages for large families. 243 As in most European coun-
tries, these government payments to parents with children are based on the
number of children in the household, and many of the payments are unre-
lated to family income. Thus, wealthy couples with children often receive
many of the same financial benefits as less fortunate parents.
This benefits scheme presents an obvious target for budget cuts. In
France, for example, the child allowance benefit is approximately $111 per
month per child to families with one or two children, $250 for three chil-
dren, and $390 for four. 244 This substantial financial grant may well sym-
bolize family importance, but it raises costs for the taxpayer and is an
unnecessary boon for higher income families. The new Socialist Prime
Minister Jospin recently proposed to cut this benefit for families with
incomes in excess of FFr 25,000, but this proposal met cries of protest in
the Parliament.2 45 The proposed budget for 1998 will introduce means
testing the child benefit for families earning in excess of FFr 25,000 a
239. See id. at 35 (ordinance of January 24, 1996, relating to urgent measures to re-
establish the financial balance of social security).
240. See Lionel Jospin, Equilibriste, ECONOMIsT, July 26, 1997, at 41. Health care
expenditures are paid for by shifting some costs to the wealthy. See Simons, supra note
214, at A8.
241. OECD, supra note 83, at 8.
242. See id. at 8-10. French officials cite fear of negative public reception to the
reforms based on social cohesion as the reason for slow reform. See id. at 10.
243. See Social Protection and Unemployment Benefits 2-3 (last visited Dec. 13, 1997)
<http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/france/soaete/protsoc.gb.html>.
244. See U.S. SocIAL SECURITY ADMIIST-RATI N, supra note 53, at 133 (containing
descriptions of detailed provisions, including child care and school benefits). See also
France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54.
245. See Craig R. Whitney, France's Premier Says Shaky Finances Put a Brake on Jobs
Plan, N.Y. TiMEs, June 20, 1997, at A7.
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month (approximately $50,000 per year) or FFr 32,000 if both parents
work.
24 6
Other budget measures also affect the middle class. France plans to
reduce grants for child care at home by half and limit tax rebates for hiring
certain domestic workers to those earning less than $90,000. Finally, the
French government plans to eliminate tax deductions for single parents
with grown children.
247
A reduction in labor costs is needed to stimulate economic growth.
With non-wage costs reaching fifty-one percent of salary in some cases,
248
the tax and bureaucratic paperwork burden on business hinders effi-
ciency. These taxes include those financing the family allowances dis-
cussed above, as well as funds to pay for low cost housing loans,
unemployment insurance, worker accident insurance, pensions, job safety,
professional training, and reducing the social security deficit. 2 49 Conse-
quently, the tax burden on employee payroll is high. Employment protec-
tion regulations, such as requiring some employers to continue paying near
full salaries to laid off employees for eighteen months, impose an onerous
burden on business, and inhibit hiring and business expansion.
250
To promote job growth, the new Socialist government proposes to
increase spending on education and employment, and will award a tax
incentive to firms that add new employees. The defense budget will con-
tain the largest cut (a 2.1% cut), along with President Chirac's plan to con-
struct an all-volunteer defense force in the future. 25 1 The proposal also
includes a series of tax increases, including "a broad-based tax on most
income, by 4.1% to 7.5% to help pay for France's welfare system."
2 52
As in Germany and Italy, funding retirement pensions for the steadily
enlarging number of retirees in France imposes enormous economic bur-
dens on the government budget, especially since the general retirement age
decreased to sixty.25 3 A recent study by the OECD suggests that these
countries face difficult prospects for the future as the ratio of workers to
recipients continues to shift.25 4 In France, red ink from the pension sys-
tem alone could drive the budget deficit to ten percent. Private pension
funds offer some relief, but government efforts to broaden them appear
246. The government pays FFr 671 a month for families with two children, FFr 1531
for three children, and FFr 2392 for four children, with FFr 32,000 if both parents are
working. See France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54.
247. See id. In addition, a 4% tax will apply to savings income.
248. See Cohen, supra note 12, at Al. For a worker with a gross monthly pay of
$1700, the employer must pay $2572 (an additional 51% of wage for social welfare
benefits) and the worker takes home only $1324. See id. at A12.
249. See id. The 1997 estimate of the social security deficit was $7 billion. See id.
250. See id.
251. See France's Budget: Circle Squared?, supra note 212, at 54. Defense arms pro-
curement will be cut "by 8.7%, forcing the military to delay some arms purchases and
development programmes." Myra MacDonald, France Budget, REUTERS, Sept. 24, 1997.
252. MacDonald, supra note 251.
253. See Social Protection and Unemployment Benefits, supra note 243, at 4.
254. See Whitney, supra note 67, at 5.
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stagnant.2 "5 In 1993, the method for calculating retirement benefits was
adjusted to include forty years of work, rather than the previous 37.5, and
the base changed from the worker's highest ten years of work to the highest
twenty-five. 2 56 In 1995 and 1996, additional reforms merged the different
pension systems into one to promote equity and efficiency, and extend the
pension system to income beyond wages.
2 57
Efforts to reform the health care system are also underway. While
attempting to raise the standards of primary health care, many of the meas-
ures, such as establishing global targets for fee levels, are designed to con-
tain costs. 258 New national agencies were established to assist in
negotiating among insurance funds, national services, and health care
establishments on quality and finance, as well as to set standards for good
practice.
25 9
Privatization provides an additional tool for the French government to
bring its budget into balance. The 1997 sale of one-third of France
Telecom, the large state telecommunications monopoly, brought a wvindfall
of $4 billion to the government. 2 60 Operating as private, independent
companies provides businesses with greater flexibility and improves their
ability to compete in the marketplace.
26 1
At the same time, the Prime Minister rejected the pleas of Air France
directors to privatize "the country's flagship airline."26 2 To gain support
from labor and other groups, the Socialists campaigned on a promise to
maintain government-owned companies, and Jospin announced that he
would suspend privatization of the rest of France Telecom and Thomson-
CSF, France's huge defense electronics company.
26 3
The austerity cuts also raised cultural issues in another way. In 1996
and 1997, the government cut maintenance efforts thirty-five percent on
the great cathedrals in France (where more tourists go than anywhere else
in the world).2 64 In Strasbourg, the government spent about $2.6 million a
year on the Romanesque and Gothic structures to restore them to their thir-




256. See Social Protection and Unemployment Benefits, supra note 243, at 4.
257. See id. at 5.
258. See EC SOCIAL PROTEC-nON, supra note 22, at 18.
259. See id.
260. See Edmund L. Andrews, No to Air France, Yes to France Telecom on Privatization,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 6, 1997, at 41. The government experienced a $6.4 billion windfall
when the state took over France Telecom's pension fund. See France: Politics Meets
Mathematics, supra note 76, at 52.
261. See Andrews, supra note 260, at 41.
262. Id. The chairman of Air France had "passionately argued that the airline had to
become a private company if it was to survive brutal new competition caused by deregu-
lation of the European airline industry." Id.
263. See France: Politics Meets Mathematics, supra note 76, at 52.
264. See Craig R. Whitney, Strasbourg Journal: A Past Etched in Stone, a Budget Weak
as Water, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 1997, at A4.
265. See id.
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The catharsis in France has proven painful. Though the International
Monetary Fund reports that economic growth is improving, it cautions that
France's plans to create more public sector jobs and other labor market
proposals "may complicate fiscal consolidation efforts and hamper eco-
nomic growth."266
D. Italy
Italy has undertaken broad fundamental economic reforms to satisfy the
convergence criteria,267 including the most radical pension reform in the
EU in recent years.2 68 Italy lowered the public spending deficit, inflation
is at its lowest in years, and governmental borrowing is approaching the
criteria limits.269 Inflation is down to approximately two percent, and the
budget deficit is down to 3.2%.27o In October 1997, the European Com-
mission revised its deficit predictions for Italy downward to three percent
of GNP, which is beneath the required convergence ceiling.271 "The ongo-
ing battle that is causing the biggest stir, however, is the race to join the
European Monetary Union,"272 as Italians face heavier taxes, cuts in gener-
ous pensions and welfare subsidies, reductions in life-long job guarantees
in the public service work force, and the imposition of merit-based salary
levels. "But what is important in the meantime is that the government has
announced its desire to put an end to a concept of work that is incompati-
ble with the new rules governing market globalization.
'273
Italy has long maintained a strong commitment to European integra-
tion, though adapting the nation's economy to the rigorous demands of the
European Community has proven problematic. 274 Recently, in its push to
meet the convergence criteria, Italy made "staggering strides" in reforming
its economy - "[n]owhere is it more obvious that the euro is fueling
profound economic adjustment in Europe. '27
5
266. INTERNATIoNAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 7, at 5.
267. See Niccolo d'Aquiro, Prodi Makes Progress, EUROPE, July-Aug. 1997, at 8-10, 14.
Some predict Italy may succeed in its bid. See A Healthy Regime, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8,
1997, at 521.
268. See EC SOCIL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 13.
269. Inflation is at 1.5%, the lowest rate in 29 years, and the GDP public debt ratio is
at 3.9%. See d'Aquiro, supra note 267, at 10.
270. See Cohen, supra note 12, at A7.
271. See Celestine Bohlen, An Accord With Communists Ends Latest Italian Political Cri-
sis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1997, at A5.
272. D'Aquiro, supra note 267, at 10. "[T]he outcome [is] unclear as the powerful
unions prepare to fight the cuts." Id. For a full description of the organization and
extent of social protection in Italy, see EC SOCIAL PROTEcTION, supra note 22, and U.S.
SOCIAL SEcuarry ADMINISTRmON, supra note 53, for alphabetical discussion of EU and
other national social security schemes.
273. D'Aquiro, supra note 267, at 8.
274. See Antonio La Pergola, Italy and European Integration: A Lawyer's Perspective, 4
IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 259 (1994). La Pergola is a professor at the University of





Predictably, the new austerity policy caused political opposition.
Amid the struggles to pass the 1998 budget, the unions ultimately with-
drew their support. This prompted the far left wing of the Communist
Party to bolt from the coalition, causing the government to lose its operat-
ing majority and ultimately fall from power.2 76 The new budget called for
$2.9 billion in cuts to pension and health care.27 7 The moderates of the
Communist Party agreed to the fiscal discipline because it constituted "the
necessary price for a more modern, flexible and competitive economy."
278
Agreement, however, came only after a demonstration of widespread pub-
lic support for the government, including criticism of the radical Commu-
nists by the more moderate Communists. Withstanding the threat, the
Prodi government re-assembled its coalition and retreated from its 1998
goals. However, it only reduced its projected $2.9 billion budget cuts by
$290 million.2 79 Farmers recently blocked roads across Italy to protest the
government's efforts to reduce milk subsidies, as part of its "spending
diet."280 The government offered to compromise with the farmers in hopes
of defusing the conflict. In spite of the struggle over the cuts, a "broad
consensus" in Italy supports joining the common currency and the associ-
ated fiscal discipline.
2 8 1
Sweeping reform of the pension system constitutes a major part of the
government efforts to reduce budget deficits.2 82 "More than 10 percent of
Italians - six million people - are officially disabled. They will cost Italy
$33 billion this year in disability pensions .... Many do have physical
handicaps but many are the healthy beneficiaries of a bygone system."
28 3
One investigation found one in four claimants lacking a disability.
284
Upon implementation of the new verification requirements, the number of
people claiming handicaps stopped rising for the first time in years.
28 5
The International Monetary Fund noted that Italy's new measures for pen-
sion reform and improved cost effectiveness consist of raising retirement
ages, increasing minimum service requirements, and reducing the propor-
tion of earnings used to compute the pension base.28 6 One reform encour-
ages later retirements by using a new pension calculation formula based on
the employee's contribution record, his life expectancy, and the expected
276. See Bohlen, supra note 271, at A10.
277. See id.
278. Id.
279. See id. at A5.
280. See John Tagliabue, Dairy Farmers Must Finance Their Subsidy, Italy Insists, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 7, 1998, at A4. Dairy farmers receive about $484 million a year, out of some
$6 billion in subsidies distributed annually by the Italian government to farmers, 90%
of which is from EU funds. Agriculture spending accounts for two-thirds of the EU's $98
billion annual budget. See id.
281. See id.




286. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 6.
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growth of the economy.28 7 Italy set limits on the accumulation of multiple
benefits from different sources, harmonized the numerous pension
schemes,288 and eliminated special benefits for public sector employ-
ees.289 These reform measures facilitated the use of supplementary pen-
sion funds composed of contributions from employers.290 More
importantly, the qualification and verification restrictions imposed on the
disability pension system resulted in enormous savings.
Much of the fiscal discipline resulted from increased taxation and
tighter control of government expenditures. For example, a "Europe tax"
raised 5.3 trillion lire, a withholding tax on employee severance pay added
5.2 trillion, and controls on cash distributions to government restrained
outlays.2 9 1 "Italy had a surplus of tax revenues over public expenditures of
almost 7% this year .... -292 The surplus tax revenues resulted from raising
the VAT [Value Added Tax] in October 1997 and implementing 15 trillion
[lire] in spending cuts. Additionally, Italy gained 4.5 trillion lire from wel-
fare reform. 293 Italy's strong anti-inflation policy contributed to its eco-
nomic stability, and its payment balance now boasts a large surplus.
294
Financial legislation introduced job regulations that promoted flexible
employment contracts and part-time work.295 These improvements built
more efficiency and harmony into Italy's industrial workplaces. "[T]he
entire system of industrial relations in Italy is changing"296 as a result of
the 1993 cooperation agreement between the government, employer
associations, and trade unions. This collaboration emphasized quality
work and employee participation in management. Employee and union
participation produced recent contract renewals without strikes, and all
parties adopted the "total quality" philosophy to improve competitive-
ness.297 Further, Italy introduced this same concept into the public sector
to re-establish efficiency and quality in public services.
298
Italy has achieved much of its fiscal progress through a privatization
plan, termed "one of the world's largest sales of national assets."299 Italy is
splitting up and selling its fifth largest industrial group (Instituto per la
Ricostruzione Industriale) over a three year period. This divestiture also
includes selling a thirty-six percent share of Banco di Roma, an eighty-six
287. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 14, 41.
288. See id. at 13, 41.
289. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 6.
290. See EC Soc.AL PRoTEcTIOn, supra note 22, at 42.
291. See id. The government also imposed a new payroll contribution tax funded
entirely by employers to offset social welfare spending. See id. at 41. Of note is that Italy
raised its family allowance above its previous low level. See id. at 42.
292. Id.
293. See id.
294. See A Healthy Regime, supra note 267, at 522.
295. See EC SocAl. PRoTEcTIoN, supra note 22, at 43.
296. Alberto Tamperi, Recent Trends in Industrial Relations in Italy, 20 HAMLINE L. REv.
621 (1997) (describing developments in Italy's new industrial labor environment).
297. See id. at 621-22. The quality goals, however, are being achieved less effectively.
298. See id. at 624-25.
299. Privatization: Hopes and Headaches, EUROPE, Nov. 1997, at 44.
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percent share in the Italian highway network, majority shares in Rome's
two airports, and the national airline (Alitalia). 30 0 Ultimately, the sale is
expected to pump over $29 billion into Italy's state treasury.
30 1
Three concurrent developments have enhanced Italy's prospects of
joining in the Euro's first round. First, Italy's vast reduction in the public-
sector deficit draws its economic numbers close to the convergence crite-
ria. Second, Germany's own economic difficulties with the criteria lessen
its ability to insist on strict convergence. Third, the shift in EU politics
since France's elections and strong French support for Italy's entry in the
first wave increase Italy's prospects for inclusion in the Euro.30 2 Italy's
dramatically improved fortunes offer the brightest story among the major
Member States.
E. Two Other Countries
Economic and social developments in two additional EU states - the
Netherlands and Britain - add balance and a broadened perspective to this
discussion.
The Dutch have enjoyed considerable success with their economy.
As Europeans wring their hands over what is usually presented as a choice
between heartless American-style modernizing of their economies and pre-
serving the old European social safety nets, many people say the Dutch have
found a third way, combining an open, vigorous market with generous social
benefits and a measure of social justice.
30 3
The Dutch economy grew faster over the last five years than the economies
in Britain, France, or Germany, and unemployment is much lower than
most of the large European countries.
30 4
The Dutch have suppressed wages, inflation, and interest rates, while
relaxing rules for hiring, firing, and opening new businesses. 30 5 There is a
"social pact" between labor, government, and employers to keep wage
demands moderate (two percent per year) in exchange for shorter work
weeks and more jobs. 30 6 When the government cut unemployment bene-
fits, many returned to work. When new laws shifted sick benefits to
employers, fewer workers used them. The labor unions also joined in the
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See A Healthy Regime, supra note 267, at 521.
303. Marlise Simons, Dutch Take "Third Way" to Prosperity, N.Y. TiMEs, June 16, 1997,
at A6.
304. See id. See also IrNEmA-noNAL MoN-r~ARY FuND, supra note 7. The Netherlands'
economy enjoys a "mature stage of... expansion with high levels of resource use." Id. at
5. It is a "promising example" of market reform, "successful in enhancing flexibility
of ... [its] economlyl." Id. at 12.
305. See Simons, supra note 303, at A6.
306. See id. In 1996, a new structure for employee insurance schemes was imple-
mented, with a central board representing employees and employers to set contribution
rates, budgeting, and the administration of funds. See EC SOCIAL PROTECTION, supra note
22, at 22. For a full description of social benefit programs, see id. at 44-45. See also U.S.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at 255-57.
Cornell International Law Journal
free market. Consumer sales and construction have increased, 30 7 and der-
egulated working hours have spurred new job creation. 308
The OECD reports that, beginning in the 1980s, the Netherlands used
a gradualist approach to pursue comprehensive reforms. 30 9 The Nether-
lands experienced lower unemployment than other European countries.
Though it once suffered from high labor costs, the Netherlands achieved
general wage moderation through centralized bargaining and tax reduc-
tions, decreased minimum wages, and scaled back payroll taxes.3 10 One
recent policy analysis noted market reforms that included limits on retire-
ment and survivor pension benefits, hospital and pharmaceutical costs,
and disability and sick pay.3 1 1 The International Monetary Fund praises
the Netherlands' successful approach to reform for demonstrating that
"there does not need to be a conflict between labor market flexibility and
social cohesion.
'3 12
Britain also offers a significantly different economic picture than the
Member States discussed above, although its economic culture is so pro-
foundly different from the Continent's that comparisons between them are
difficult.3 13 Evolving British positions deserve mention for two reasons.
First, Britain's changed political position on monetary union could pro-
mote the European integration process. Second, its two-directional social
policy, which publicly embraces the broad European social protection
norms of the Social Charter, appears to maintain the spreading ethos of
social cost cutting. The Blair Labor government has surprised most, and
angered some, onlookers with "hard-edged social reforms" that have gener-
ated protests reminiscent of the struggles in France and Germany.
3 14
307. See Simons, supra note 303, at A6.
308. See id.
309. See OECD, supra note 83, at 8.
310. See id. at 7.
311. See Kopits, supra note 12, at 6-7; EC Soci. PROTECION, supra note 22, at 16-17,
45-46. New laws also impose stricter procedures for qualifying for social benefits,
emphasizing the recipient's more active role in seeking employment, and measures safe-
guarding against fraud and abuse. See id.
312. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FuND, supra note 7, at 13.
313. See Roger Cohen, Under the Knife, Each Welfare State Has Its Own Pain Threshold,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1997, at A7. Britain has a stronger economy, less unemployment,
and a history of emphasis on individual initiative. See Warren Hoge, Blair Hoping to
Disarm Critics, Creates Agency to Work for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at A6. Wage
burdens are also far less with social security taxes adding only 10% to the wage bill in
Britain, while 50% is added in France. The OECD reports that the U.K. began wide-
spread structural reform in the 1980s and, after implementing it, now suffers less unem-
ployment. And while the U.K. had a heritage of national industries and troubled labor
relations, its efforts focused on privatization and product market reform. Britain scaled
back unemployment benefits and employment protection, while public sector employ-
ment relations have been made similar to the private system. See OECD, supra note 83,
at 7-9.
314. Blair welfare reform measures have "provoked a backlash from his own party
and public dismay from protesters as diverse as farmers, butchers, students, consumers,
welfare recipients and genteel country people." William D. Montalbano, Blair Beset by
the Pesky Realities of Governing, Naw ORLEANs TIMES PIcAY uNE, Dec. 27, 1997, at A16.
"Blair has built on inherited Conservative free-market economic strengths. . . " intends
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Britain's previous stalwart opposition to the single currency and its
public declaration that it will not participate in the first round have ren-
dered convergence criteria comparisons less meaningful. 3 15 Further, the
International Monetary Fund and the OECD contrast Britain's strong econ-
omy with the weakness found in Germany, France, and Italy.3 16 Nonethe-
less, the new government's attitude toward the EU marks an important
turn around, and may signal smoother passage of legislation promoting
many aspects of Community policy. The well-known British opposition to
the common currency is finally softening. Reports from Britain suggest
that the new Labor government "was considering joining the single cur-
rency shortly after its introduction in 1999."
3 17
Signaling another similar attitude shift, Britain has accepted the Social
Charter. However, this movement of the new Socialist government seems
not to reflect a softer outlook on the issues under discussion here. Prime
Minister Blair has taken an aggressive stand on "tight spending restraints
and toughened welfare standards."3 18 In fact, numerous legislative initia-
tives and public statements demonstrate some convergence with the trends
in Germany, France, and Italy. Blair's economic strategy is to produce
higher tax revenues, while lowering social welfare payments and encourag-
ing work, not dependency. 3 19 In 1997, for example, as a part of his policy
of "tough compassion" and emphasizing work opportunities and training,
Blair issued a decision to cut benefits to unemployed single parents.
3 20
With this tough stance on social welfare, the Labor Party has found itself
enjoying the acceptance of the traditional conservatives and the aspiring
middle class.3 2 1 However, it has caused some discord among its own
ranks.
In October 1996, the government replaced the "Unemployment Benefit
and Income Supplement" with the 'Jobseeker's Allowance," which requires
the recipient to sign a written contract setting forth a job search and train-
to focus on the "strategy of getting the unemployed off benefits and back to work," and
has recently passed $100 million in spending cuts. Id.
315. European Monetary Institute data includes Britain in criteria comparisons. See
EUROPEAN MoNETARY INsvnrIE, supra note 7, at 54-55. The OECD also includes Britain
in all general economic analyses. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 54, at 17-45 (providing a
detailed analysis of employment and social benefits data).
316. INTERNATIONAL MoNaETAY FUND, supra note 7, at 3, 5, 12.
317. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Report Says British Warm to Euro Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27,
1997, at Dl. The Financial Times cited an unidentified government official who
described Cabinet discussions about Britain joining the currency after its 1999 introduc-
tion but before the next British general elections in 2003. See id.
318. Hoge, supra note 313, at A6.
319. See David Lennon, Tony Blair's Britain, EURoPE, Dec. 97-Jan. 98, at 10. For a
description of British social protection system and reforms, see EC SocIA. PROTECTION,
supra note 22, at 53-56.
320. See EC SOCAL PROTECTION, supra note 22, at 53-56. These benefits, called the
"Lone Parent Premiums" and "One Parent Benefits" began phasing out in April 1997. Id.
at 17.
321. See id. The shift in ideology to the center is reminiscent of the current U.S.
political analogue.
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ing plan.32 2 Other reforms include limits on single parent benefits, hous-
ing benefits, and benefits to non-citizens. The Social Security
Administration has reorganized and streamlined its operations, and priva-
tized its social services.323 The Blair government has even suggested abol-
ishing free university tuition, the "keystone of the welfare state,"324 and
reports suggest that disability and health benefits are under study for
reforms as well.325 Britain hopes the new approaches will promote labor
market flexibility and reduce unemployment, yet maintain an acceptable
level of social cohesion.
326
V. United States Targets
In August 1996, President Clinton signed the Republican-inspired welfare
reform law, the "Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act" (PRWORA). 3 27 This new legislation radically altered basic gov-
ernment policy regarding social welfare assistance to the poor in the
United States and was called "the most fundamental changes in programs
affecting low-income persons since the inception of the Social Security Act
in 1935."328 The PRWORA terminates the federal government's longstand-
ing obligation to provide basic aid to the poor by abolishing cash assist-
ance, as well as reducing and restricting Supplemental Security Income,329
child care programs, 330 child nutrition programs, 331 Food Stamps,332 and
322. Id. at 16, 53.
323. Social security offices may be sold and leased back to the government, leaving
property management to the new landlords, while the delivery of certain benefits may be
"contracted out" to private agencies. See id. at 20, 53-56.
324. Montalbano, supra note 314, at A16.
325. See id.
326. See Bruce Barnard, Inside Europe, Dec. 97-Jan. 98, at 1. The United States enjoys
low unemployment but little social protection; the Continent suffers chronic unemploy-
ment but maintains high social cohesion; the United Kingdom and the Netherlands take
a middle approach to acceptable levels of both.
327. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996,
PUB. L. No. 104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). See Jeffery Katz, For the Record: Overhaul
Law, Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep., Sept. 21, 1996, at 2696. The passage of the bill stemmed
from the Nov. 8, 1994 elections in which Republicans gained majority control of both
the House of Representatives and the Senate. They campaigned on a platform called the
"Contract With America" and promised, among other things, structural change in U.S.
welfare laws. See also Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 10, 24-26.
328. Alan W. Houseman, Legal Representation and Advocacy Under the PRWORA of
1996, CLEARINGHOUSE REv.,Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 732. One scholar's observations concern-
ing economic deregulation applies here:
the movement toward greater state autonomy has been associated with deregula-
tion both as a theoretical and as a political matter. In theory, devolution encour-
ages deregulation by giving individual states discretion to relax uniform
rules.... Not surprisingly, state empowerment has found favor among politi-
cians looking for ways to roll back intrusive federal economic regulation.
Helen A. Garten, Devolution and Deregulation: The Paradox of Financial Reform, 14 YALE
L. & POL'Y REv. 65, 65 (1996).
329. See PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF
1996, PUB. L. No. 140-193, §§ 201-32, 110 Stat. 2105, 2185-98 (1996) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1382).
330. See id. § 601-15 (amending 42 U.S.C. H2 9858).
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Medicaid.333 One Congressman described this fundamental policy shift as
"mov[ing] to a new paradigm."334
The Congressional Budget Office estimated government savings of
over $50 billion through fiscal 2002, and proponents hope that it will move
thousands of people from welfare to work, ending the U.S. liberal welfare
policy of the past six decades and transferring much of the money and
regulatory responsibility to the states.335 One source estimates a reduction
of two million welfare recipients in the first year and a half.33 6 Early 1998
statistics show welfare rolls declining to a twenty-five-year low.33 7 The new
federal law and accompanying state regulation, coupled with a booming
economy, produced this substantial decrease.
338
The PRWORA includes three major tools for implementing this broad
overhaul. First, federal funding is re-routed through the states as block
grants, giving the states broad control over their administration. Second,
regulations impose requirements on recipients, including requirements
that recipients work within two years of receiving aid and limiting all wel-
fare assistance to five years. Third, the regulations affect a broad array of
benefits - cash welfare payments, food stamps, immigration regulations,
aid to disabled children, federal child care assistance, and enforcement of
child care orders. 339 The general theme of the legislation is to jettison the
long standing federal guarantee of welfare support in favor of state-run wel-
fare programs.
The most financially significant cuts come in the reduction of the food
stamp program and aid to legal immigrants.340 The transfer of money and
331. See id. §§ 701-42 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1757).
332. See id. §§ 801-91 (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014).
333. See id. § 114 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396).
334. Representative Timothy J. Roemer of Indiana urged Clinton to sign the bill and
explained that recipients will no longer simply be given something, but will be required
to "sign a contract to improve themselves." Barbara Vobejda, America Moves Away from
the Welfare State, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug 2, 1996, at 1.
335. Critics claim that $55 billion in welfare cuts to the poorest people in America
will result in as many as 2.6 million additional people living below the poverty line by
2002. See Houseman, supra note 328, at 2.
336. See Jason DeParle, Success, and Frustration, as Welfare Rules Change, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 30, 1997, at Al [hereinafter DeParle, Success] ("Two million women and children
have left the rolls."). Over 1.4 million families have left welfare since the 1994 case load
peak. See id. at A16. State welfare rolls have declined due to the effects of the stricter
guidelines - Oregon's by 50% in the first three years. See Jason DeParle, The 'Drawer
People': Newest Challenge for Welfare: Helping the Hard-Core Jobless, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20,
1997, at Al [hereinafter DeParle, The 'Drawer People'].
337. See Robert Pear, Number on Welfare Dips Below 10 Million, N.Y. Tnss, Jan. 21,
1998, at A12.
338. See Paul Glastris, Was Reagan Right?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 20, 1997,
at 30. Some suggest that the new strict supervision has chased away welfare fraud. See
id.
339. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2645, 2696.
340. SeeJeffrey L. Katz, Changes in New Law Hinge on Budget Deal, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP. 3293, 3311 (1996) (describing food stamp cuts of $23 billion - about 13% - and
aid to immigrants in the same amount through the year 2002). "The legislation elimi-
nates eligibility for thousands of food stamp recipients and severely reduces Federal
funds available for the Food Stamp Program." Houseman, supra note 328, at 932.
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authority to the states, however, manifests fundamental and structural
alterations.341 In one of the most significant changes, block grants to the
states for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) replaced the
well-known federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 342 Placing
billions of dollars and broad administrative authority in the hands of the
states marks a radical change in the philosophy343 and structure of welfare
assistance in the United States.
TANF provides states with broad discretion over spending federal
funds in any reasonable manner to accomplish the general purposes of the
law.3 44 A few general guidelines do apply, however. Each state is required
to file a plan for eligibility and distribution of these benefits every two
years. 345 The federal legislation required states to switch over by July 1,
1997, and to spend at least seventy-five percent of the sums they spent in
the previous year for social assistance. Federal work requirements play a
central role in this delegation to the states. Adult recipients of assistance
must begin working within two years of receiving that aid, and states must
have a certain percentage of their welfare caseload participating in work
activities.3
46
Consequently, states have autonomy in shaping the administration of
government assistance. With each state designing different programs,
some states will perform more effectively than others in constructing safety
nets for the poor. Amid some reports of early successes in states with
strong economies, poorer regions appear less successful. While the overall
dual purposes of budget reduction and work promotion appear advanced,
the related and more difficult questions naturally relate to human cost and
fairness.
A vivid example was recently reported in an acutely depressed area of
Mississippi. The Delta region along the Mississippi River has a ten percent
Another study estimates Food Stamp reductions at $28 billion, by "almost 20 percent,
the equivalent of reducing the average food stamp benefit from its current level of 80
cents per person per meal to 66 cents per person per meal." David Super et al., The New
Welfare Law - Summary, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (last visited Aug. 13,
1996) <http://www.cbpp.org/WCNSUM.HTM>.
341. See Houseman, supra note 328, at 932.
342. TANF block grants to the states in the amount of $16.4 billion replaced AFDC.
See Katz, supra note 327, at 2696-97. For historical and detailed discussion of the
changes in the government programs, see generally Sheila Ards, Contract With America:
The Implications to the Children, 2 LoYoLA PovERTY LJ. 89 (1996).
343. The AFDC philosophy of strict entitlements for all needy persons sharply con-
trasts with the mantra of work and limited benefits.
344. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2697.
345. States must explain the following: how the state plan will require and ensure
that parents who receive assistance will engage in work activities within two months of
receiving benefits; how it will ensure equitable treatment in determining eligibility and
delivery of benefits; how it will prevent and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and how
the state intends to treat families moving into the state differently from other residents.
See Katz, supra note 327, at 2696-97.
346. See id. at 2697-98 (rising from 25% in fiscal 1997 to 50% in 2002).
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unemployment rate.3 4 7 Under the new Mississippi program to encourage
welfare recipients to work, the welfare rolls have diminished statewide, as
they have in many areas in the United States. Unfortunately, many of those
unemployed in the impoverished Delta area cannot find jobs as required by
the new strict state rules conditioning welfa.re assistance on a return to
work.348 These families will lose their cash assistance checks, food
stamps, and medical insurance for adults.3 49 Many of those newly
employed leave the jobs because of practical problems (caring for children)
and lose their benefit.350 In one Delta county, of 1,299 participants in the
workfare program, "only 61 got subsidized jobs and only 15 kept them -
about 1% of the case load."
35 1
In rural areas like the Mississippi Delta, several factors combine to dis-
courage the switch from welfare to work. 'Jobs and child care are
scarce;"35 2 distances between homes and jobs can be large, with no public
transportation, and education is poor. The matter is exacerbated because
TANF allocates federal dollars according to how much a state previously
spent on such assistance. Thus, Mississippi receives half of the federal
money that many other states receive.
3 53
Recent experience with Connecticut's adaptation of the federal man-
date offers another example. Adopting one of the shortest time limits for
welfare receipt of all states, at twenty-one months, Connecticut's new law
cut off benefits for approximately 450 families in November 1997.
3 54
Approximately 950 families had exhausted their twenty-one month eligibil-
347. See Jason DeParle, What About Mississippi?: Welfare Law Weighs Heavy in Delta,
Where Jobs Are Few, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at Al. The Delta is "the poorest region in
the poorest state .. " and its "poverty rate of 41% is nearly three times the national
average." Id. at A24.
348. One report shows that families removed from welfare eligibility "for violating the
new work rules outnumbered those placed in jobs by a margin of nearly two to one." Id.
at Al. And in a state where 80% of those on welfare are black, the racial overtone adds
to the misfortune. See id.
349. The work rules require unemployed people to attend job search classes, accept
job assignments, and stay with them, or lose assistance eligibility. See id. at A24.
350. For example, Mississippi provides $120 a month for a mother with two children.
See id. Mississippi's "Work First" program offered financial incentives to businesses to
hire former welfare recipients (the employer pays only the first $1 per hour of minimum
wage, with the state paying the remaining $4.15 for the first six months) and it required
recipients to attend job-search classes and cuts off benefits to those who did not attend
the classes or accept offers on employment. See id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See id. Wisconsin receives $7,200 per family, Mississippi gets about $2,100; the
average is $4,100. See id. Oregon receives about $6,600 and adds substantial state con-
tributions. See id.
354. SeeJonathan Rabinovitz, Connecticut Welfare Cutoff Falls on Hundreds of Families,
N.Y. Tmirs, Nov. 3, 1997, at Bi. Connecticut's program is three-pronged, "combining
the 21 month limit with penalties and incentives to move welfare recipients into the
labor market." Id. To encourage those who are cut off to get jobs, the program preserves
their Medicaid and child care subsidies. Also, extensions are available, depending on
the circumstances, when jobs are not found through no fault of the recipient. See id. On
the other hand, sanctions are included for failure to make a good-faith effort at finding a
job and have not participated in an intensive case-management program. See id.
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ity, but half were granted six-month extensions. Of those losing benefits,
Connecticut cut off 380 because of the twenty-one month time limit, and
Connecticut determined that sixteen families did not make a good faith
effort to find jobs. 35 5 Approximately 100 families lost benefits because
they failed to show up for interviews with welfare officials, had children
that became too old, or failed to meet some other requirement.356 State
officials expressed approval of the law because the number of individuals
on welfare decreased substantially and many of those removed from the
rolls had found jobs.
3 57
New federal legislation also limited eligibility for another form of fed-
eral assistance, Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSI is for the low-
income disabled and elderly. SSI benefits, averaging $436 a month, are
used for food, clothing, shelter, and other care costs for the disabled.
358
One estimate suggests that the new law will affect 1.2 million recipients,
359
especially children.360 For example, the new law and its strict interpreta-
tions make it more difficult for children to qualify for SSI.3 61 One study
revealed that the government denied benefits to fifty-six percent of the
170,300 cases re-evaluated in the first stages.
362
Under the new law, a child's medical condition that would qualify for
adult disability no longer qualifies for aid. The law eliminates the previous
"comparable severity" standard and now requires "marked and severe func-
tional limitations" causing death or lasting longer than a year.36 3 Recipi-
ents of this SSI will also be re-evaluated every three years, and many are
355. See id.
356. See id.
357. See id. at B5. Reports from Idaho include similar numbers, where its program
bars welfare assistance after 24 months and cash assistance has been reduced and lim-
ited regardless of the number of children living in a household. See Soup Kitchens Fill
After Idaho Welfare Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, at 22. Notably, Idaho has seen a 70%
decline in the number of single women with children applying for federal and state cash
assistance. See id.
358. See Robert Pear, U.S. Mistakenly Cuts Benefits for Many Disabled Children, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at Al.
359. See Claudia Schlosberg, States Ignore Due Process Protections - 1.6 million Medi-
caid Beneficiaries at Risk, National Health Law Program 1 (Feb. 10, 1997).
360. The CBO estimates that approximately 315,000 children who would have been
receiving SSI benefits in 2002 will lose eligibility. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2699.
361. See Pear, supra note 358, at Al.
362. See Robert Pear, After a Review, 95,000 Children Will Lose Cash Disability Benefit,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at Al. Later figures show that 236,586 children have been re-
examined and over 142,000 have been cut off (60%), and over 225,000 new claims have
been denied. See Pear, supra note 358, at Al. The American Bar Association and others
have objected to the law, which one Senator complains increases suffering for "the most
vulnerable of our society." Id.
363. Katz, supra note 327, at 2699. The old standard made children eligible who had
"impairments that seriously limited their ability to perform activities normal for their
age," while the new law requires the "marked and severe" limitation. Pear, supra note
362, at Al. Other restrictive limitations apply, such as a more restrictive Listing of
Impairments, and excluding behavioral functioning. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2699.
See also Rita L. DiSimone, Major Welfare Reforms Enacted in 1996, SocIAL SECURITY BULL.,
Fall 1996, at 57.
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already being denied eligibility upon re-assessment.3 64 The Congressional
Budget Office predicts that the new rules will affect about 315,000 children
by the year 2002.365 Some critics fear that the strict implementation guide-
lines will disqualify many children with low IQs, diabetes, and AIDS, even
beyond the letter of the original 1996 Congressional enactment.
3 66
Child care for working parents is essential to encourage parents to
leave welfare. Federal funding for child care for low income families is now
channeled through the block grants to the states and new procedures to
establish paternity and enforce child support orders are also included in
the law.367 The Summer Food Service Program for Children will receive a
smaller federal subsidy and similar reductions will take place in subsidies
to food programs for family day care homes (except for those in low-
income neighborhoods).
368
The new law also diminished the broad federal food stamp program.
It reduced the food stamp assistance and added new work requirements. It
cut individual allotments by lowering the percentage of entitlements on the
agricultural department standard and modified calculations for eligibility
by changing certain deductions in the qualifying process.3 69 The new
work requirement mandates that food stamp recipients without depen-
dents work at least twenty hours per week or participate in state-approved
work, training, or workfare programs. 3 70 Poor, unemployed people
between eighteen and fifty years of age without children can have food
stamps limited to just three months in a three year period.
3 7 1
Immigrants are particularly affected by the new law. Both illegal
aliens and legal non-immigrants, such as travelers and students, face added
restriction for eligibility for SSI, food stamps, and other benefits.3 72 The
government will refuse to provide current legal immigrants with SSI and
food stamps until they become U.S. citizens, and those receiving the bene-
fits prior to the new law must have had an eligibility review in 1997.
3 73
The government will deny future legal immigrants low income assistance
for their first five years in the United States. "Although legal immigrants
represent only about 6% of those on public aid, they took the brunt of the
cuts made by the welfare law."3 74 In fact, the 1996 welfare bill aimed forty
364. See Pear, supra note 362, at Al.
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2700, 2702.
368. See id. at 2703.
369. See id.
370. See id. at 2704. Waivers of these rules are possible for jobless areas and those hit
hardest by unemployment, and exceptions for the work requirement are made for preg-
nant women, those caring for incapacitated persons, and others. See id.
371. See Super et al., supra note 340, 9.
372. See Katz, supra note 327, at 2701.
373. See id. at 2701-02 (allowing exceptions for refugees, veterans, and those who
have worked here for ten years).
374. George Soros, Legal Immigrants Deserve a Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997,
at Al. One recent report from New York illustrates the impact on immigrants, citing the
denial of food stamps to more than 50,000 legal immigrants between the ages of 18 and
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percent of the cuts at legal immigrants.375
Significantly, the states maintain wide discretion in determining eligi-
bility and distribution guidelines for assistance to immigrants.376 The
1996 federal welfare provisions allow individual states to calculate welfare
benefits for new residents by using the rules of the newcomers' previous
residences, thus discouraging movement of people from one state to
another to gain higher welfare benefits. 377 Pennsylvania used this new
power to enact a welfare distribution system which, for example, allocated
$304 a month in cash assistance to a poor eight-member family from
Puerto Rico (that amount based on the sum allowed in Puerto Rico) rather
than the $836 permitted to similar families residing in Pennsylvania for a
year or more. 378 Predictably, the family moved back to Puerto Rico upon
failure to qualify for more support, insisting that they had insufficient
assistance to pay for even basic shelter and clothing in Philadelphia. In a
class action suit, the district court found the state law unconstitutional.
Pennsylvania intended the law to discourage an influx of poor people and
to encourage people to work. The court held that the law violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it had a
disparate impact on particular immigrant groups and failed "miserably" to
achieve its purpose of encouraging people to work.
3 79
The 1996 welfare law also restricted Medicaid, the joint federal-state
health insurance program for the poor.380 Unlike the previous system,
which recognized categorical eligibility based on receipt of welfare and
immigration status, states are now permited to modify the qualification
standards and methodologies. 381 Additionally, state law may deny Medi-
caid benefits to those who refuse to satisfy the state's work require-
ments.38 2 Illegal aliens are ineligible for Medicaid and states may deny
coverage for legal aliens who have not yet become citizens.383 New immi-
grants are also disqualified from obtaining Medicaid benefits for five years
after entry, and those who will lose their SSI benefits also lose Medicaid
59 in just four months. See Rachel L. Swarns, Denied Food Stamps, Many Legal Immi-
grants Scrape for Meals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at B1. "The law, which was intended to
move foreigners off public assistance and into jobs, has pushed an estimated 770,000
immigrants off the food stamp rolls across the nation, Federal officials say." Id.
375. See Soros, supra note 374, at Al.
376. "States may choose to deny most legal immigrants... benefits from the welfare,
Medicaid, and social services block grants." Katz, supra note 340, at 2702.
377. See Robert Pear, Judge Rules States Can't Cut Welfare for New Residents, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1997, at Al, A20.
378. Thirteen other states have taken similar action. See id.
379. See id.
380. The federal and state governments share funding to provide a comprehensive
range of services to those who satisfy certain requirements demonstrating financial
need. In 1965, federal law established this program with federal guidelines, but each
state may design its own program within those guidelines.
381. See DiSimone, supra note 363, at 60.
382. See Katz, supra note 340, at 2698 (explaining that the Medicaid coverage would
continue for the children of such a disqualified person).




Under the 1997 balanced budget bill passed in July, Congress reversed
some previous cuts of programs for the poor. At President Clinton's urg-
ing, Congress restored some of the benefits for the poor that existed prior
to the 1996 cuts. Despite this, about one million households will lose food
stamps, two-thirds of which are families with children.
385
Nevertheless, the President's bill significantly changed the implemen-
tation of the 1996 reforms. 38 6 For example, food stamp limits now have a
wider range of exemptions; minimum wage is required for workfare recipi-
ents (minimum wage is required for welfare recipients who take state cre-
ated jobs) and SSI and Medicaid benefits are restored to legal immigrants
living in the United States prior to August 22, 1996. Additionally, a new
welfare-to-work tax credit for employers who hire persons previously on
welfare will help the unemployed find jobs. 38 7 Notably, the bill also allo-
cated $24 billion to provide Medicaid benefits to half of the nation's ten
million children who lack health insurance.
As it turns out, fewer than half of the states will meet the guidelines
for requiring welfare recipients to go to work.388 Many now urge that the
regulation requiring work from seventy-five percent of the two parent fami-
lies on welfare was unrealistic. 38 9 Rather, most states have twenty-five per-
cent of the total caseload in work activities.
390
When assessing the targets (or victims) of welfare reform, one discov-
ers that the intended goals are often misleading. While encouraging people
to work sparked much of the reform enthusiasm, statistics show that
nearly two-thirds of all welfare recipients are children.391 By the time the
welfare law's five year limit takes effect, between 2.5 and 3.5 million chil-
dren could be affected.
392
Other statistics demonstrate that the welfare abuse rationale is merely
an inaccurate stereotype. A majority of welfare recipients live in the South,
not in cities.393 About 39% are Caucasian, 37% African American, 18%
Hispanic, and many do not hold high school diplomas.394 While the wel-
384. See id. States may not deny emergency medical care to either legal or illegal
aliens, and other exceptions exist. See id.
385. See id.
386. See Peter T. Kilborn, In Budget Bill, President Wins Welfare Battle, N.Y. TiMas, Aug.
1, 1997, at Al.
387. See id. at A12.
388. See DeParle, supra note 30, at Al.
389. See id. This problem is primarily political. See id. at A14. Interestingly, almost
half of the two parent families affected by this law are refugees in California. See id.
390. See id.
391. See Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 35 (citing Comm. on Ways and Means,
103d Cong., 2d Sess., Background Material and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdic-
tion of the Committee on Ways and Means 409,454 (Comm. Print 1994)).
392. See Super et al., supra note 340, at 2. Senator Patrick Moynahan has stated that,
"You won't know what you've done until the five year cut off begins." DeParle, Success,
supra note 336, at A17.
393. See Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 57.
394. See id.
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fare rolls are falling dramatically, only time will reveal the specific nature
and magnitude of the new laws' impact.
A discussion of federal spending reductions should include defense
spending cuts. The U.S. defense budget has undergone extensive cuts,
totaling about $40 billion over five years. According to one estimate, the
1992 outlay for military defense of $286.8 billion will have been reduced to
$247 billion.395 From 1988 to 1995, the government closed almost 100
major domestic military bases and recommendations for 1998 include
another round of base closings. This means a $15 billion a year shift from
personnel and operating costs to procurement.396 Defense Secretary
Cohen has advocated a "revolution in business affairs," calling for slim-
ming down or contracting out non-combat affairs.397 The pentagon has
cut its size by about a third, while military bases reduced their size by
18%.398
The budget reforms have produced measurable change. 399 Billions of
dollars and considerable authority have shifted to the states. The states
responded by imposing a vast network of tougher welfare regulations, and
the welfare rolls have diminished dramatically. Military bases are closed
and spending reduced. President Clinton may have been correct when he
predicted that this is not the end of the changes, but the beginning.400
VI. Convergence - Divergence - Paradigm Shifting
Initially, distinctions between legal and political reform must acknowledge
the interdependence of law and politics. In both Europe and the United
States, the current discourse of change "is much wider than doctrine and
norms and ... the very dichotomy of law and politics is questionable."'40 '
The 1994 political revolution in the United States presaged the legal one in
1996. Though the landscape continues to shift as the political and legal
actors react to voter reception, these two events are substantially inter-
395. See CONG. Q. ALMANAC 100 (1993) (for 1992 figure); CONG. Q. ALMANAC 2-18
(1996) (for estimated 1997 figure). Federal social services expenditures rose from
$12.2 billion in 1992 to an estimated $16.2 billion in 1997. See id.
396. See CONG. Q., May 10, 1997, at 1081.
397. Id.
398. See id. at 1082 (providing detailed numerical reductions in specific line items,
such as army divisions, ships, jet fighters, ballistic missiles, etc.). "Under pressure from
Congress to reduce the Pentagon's bureaucracy before ordering more cuts in troops or
weapons, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen plans to trim thousands of civilian jobs
at the Pentagon and transfer thousands more military personnel out of their headquar-
ters and into the field." Steven Lee Myers, Pentagon to Trim Thousands of Jobs Held by
Civilians, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at Al. "A sweeping plan to reorganize the Penta-
gon's bureaucracy, to streamline operations and to otherwise save money .... has been
adopted. Id. Plans to hold two more rounds of base closings have been revived in the
hopes of saving $6 billion. See id. The United States reduced the number of troops from
2.1 million (at the end of the cold war) down to 1.4 million in 1997. See id.
399. "Perhaps the simplest of all surprises is that welfare really changed. Unlike previ-
ous welfare laws, this one was not a paper reform confined to a White House lawn."
DeParle, The 'Drawer People,' supra note 336, at A16.
400. See id. at Al.
401. Weiler, supra note 3, at 2409.
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twined. Similarly, the recent political volatility displayed at the Amsterdam"
Treaty negotiations illustrated a political-legal relationship.
402
The dominant influence of economics in the legal and political context
of the evolving European Union and the devolving U.S. federalism suggests
a preeminent divergence between the two approaches. As noted at length
above, the European and U.S. economies could hardly be more dissimilar.
In Europe, a modest recovery is underway, but crippling unemployment
continues to restrain economic progress. However, unemployment dwarfs
other EU economic concerns, and the new Treaty specifically demands
action on this sore subject. The growing numbers of payees of the gener-
ous European unemployment and retirement benefits combine with the
reduced number of employed payors to spiral the budget deficits steeply
upward. The soured economic recovery has progressed radically to alter
the political and economic chemistry of entry into the single currency's
third stage, with potentially profound effects. German insistence on strict
adherence to the convergence criteria is undermined by its own budgetary
shortfall. Furthermore, Germany's displeasure at the inclusion of weaker
economies in the first wave, contributing to a "softer" euro, may have a
destructive effect on the single currency process.
The United States, by contrast, has enjoyed the economic boom, which
has buoyed prospects for continued reform. Unemployment reached
thirty-year lows in 1997, inflation remained subdued, and other indicators
of strong economic growth forecast a period of constructive prosperity.
40 3
Witnessing this different mixture of economic, political, and legal forces in
the two spheres must impress the observer with the complexity of move-
ments in each context.
To the extent that these economic and legal changes are judged to con-
stitute reform depends on their depth and duration. While many of the
budgetary changes noted may prove superficial, temporary accounting
adjustments and other legislative changes - such as constitutional amend-
ments granting parliaments new powers or complete legislative overhauls
of longstanding administrative apparatus - appear to be more substantial
and may endure to constitute significant reform. As legislation validates
evolving legal norms and social expectations, reform may accrete slowly in
unforeseen ways. The complexity, interconnectedness, and gradual
unfolding of the legal and social movements necessarily become a part of
the broader movements themselves.
This wide range of legal, political, economic, and social developments,
concurrently across two continents, presents a plethora of similarities and
differences. From minor, discrete, concrete changes in social benefit rules
to broad, abstract alteration of governing principles, some of the develop-
ments represent systemic convergences, while others merely coincidence.
One may see some of the evolving convergences as concentric within other
402. The speed of continuing European integration was throttled back. Of particular
note is the slowing of the rate of accessions.
403. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (U.S. economic summary).
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convergences and others as part of multidirectional movements, converging
in one direction, with divergent side-effects in the opposite direction.
These often heavy tides can carry cross-currents and smaller, separate rivu-
lets in the path. Thus, careful scrutiny and some skepticism should frame
any effort at broad categorization.
Many differences in the national developments stand out boldly and
appear on one level to overwhelm the comparisons. Different perspectives
will reflect deep-rooted variances because the European civil law tradition
derives from a different philosophical and historical basis than the U.S.
common law system. 404 The starkly divergent U.S. and European exper-
iences in the two apocalyptic wars of this century add to their separate
views on many subjects. Physical geography affects the proximity to Marx-
ism that has contributed to the different outlooks, while varying access to
resources, vulnerability to political and military threats, and physical size.
Most continental countries are only slowly approaching the unprecedented
ethnic diversity that exists in the United States. The European traditions of
governing through consensus building, cooperation with strong labor
unions, and a coalitional multi-party system contribute to differing percep-
tions and experiences with the government process.40 5 The recent eco-
nomic experiences noted above, like opposite trends of record-high versus
record-low unemployment, inevitably cast different impressions on the two
cultures. These interwoven differences provide a relevant and pointed
divergence between the U.S. and European tradition of social solidarity and
comprehensive, social protection.
406
This comparison of European and U.S. legal reform reveals significant
differences in world views. The political climate in the United States has
recommended delay in two sensitive areas: pensions and health care.
Widespread restructuring of these systems has begun in most European
countries. Moreover, every European nation considered in this Article has
enacted new retirement pension legislation. German legislation has low-
ered pension benefits, increased employee contributions, and raised retire-
ment vesting ages. Austria's new laws have also raised retirement ages,
404. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRaDIION (2d ed. 1985)
(distinguishing civil and common law methodology).
405. Another interesting characteristic of European government has been the tradi-
tion of leadership by an elite group. For example in France, the same elite school edu-
cated two of the last three Presidents and six of the last eight Prime Ministers. See The
Ever Surprising Lionel Jospin, ECONOMIST, June 7, 1997 at 50. Presidents of the United
States rarely attend the same school. Instead, U.S. political leaders receive their wisdom
from public opinion polls. U.S. News reports House Majority Leader Army comment-
ing: "I think the president gets up in the morning, he reads the polls, and he says, 'Ah,
now I've read my biography for the day.'" Ronald Brownstein, Clintonism, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Jan. 26, 1998, at 23. In one voter survey, 58% agreed that the president "is
driven by polls and the politics of the moment." Id.
406. See Paul Spicker, Exclusion and Citizenship in France (paper on file with author).
The European concept of social solidarity presents a different philosophical basis for
social protection: an overarching concept of social cohesion in which people are "linked
to one another through a complex network of interrelated obligations - both reciprocal
and collective." Id. at 13-15.
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encouraging workers to work longer by adjusting payout formulas. Italy
and France have followed suit and have even re-organized and harmonized
their previously complex pension funds and agencies.
In comparison, the United States has only marginally attempted disa-
bility pension reform. Widespread criticism of the U.S. Supplemental
Security Income reductions have not resulted in a comprehensive plan.
Throughout Europe, countries are enforcing the disability pension qualifi-
cations more vigorously, emphasizing rehabilitation measures to promote a
return to work.
Similarly, the United States has not enacted broad legislation that
would reorganize the structure of public health care along the model of
France, Austria, or other countries. This is not to say that the forces of
competition have not generated change in U.S. health care. Indeed, corpo-
rate consolidations and contract management of services have caused
widespread change in the private sector. However, the U.S. government
has yet to reform the public health system to match European guarantees of
quality universal medical care.
While the different course and pace of reform in these areas is reflec-
tive of the differing political and social circumstances, a long-term view
may actually disclose more of a convergence in policy objectives. In the
United States, the public rhetoric of health care reform, social security refi-
nancing, and other benefit restructuring may produce results similar to
those in Europe. Thus, although the complex evolution may include differ-
ent forms and sequences of change, these events may ultimately lead to
similar movements.
The consistent legislative efforts to improve labor market flexibility in
Germany, Italy, Austria, and France represent another apparent divergence
in legislative activity. Efforts to reduce the financial and bureaucratic bur-
dens on employment, employer payroll contributions, and restrictions on
contracts and hours have little concurrent analogues in the United States.
The German example illustrates the new approach: specific legislation has
resulted in allowing longer working hours, facilitating the hiring of
independent contractors, reducing sick pay by twenty percent, raising vest-
ing periods and lowering calculation sums for some employee pension ben-
efits, and eliminating much of the employee dismissal protection for
smaller businesses. Timing and past experience are distinguishing factors,
as U.S. work style flexibility and quality promotion have emerged in
response to foreign technology improvements in the past decade. U.S. job
restrictions and tax burdens were never as onerous as in modern Europe.
The different status of labor unions in the two economies contributes to
this divergence. The strong European labor unions have advanced and pro-
tected workers' benefits through decades of economic good health. Fund-
ing for social solidarity was built into the employment relationship, placing
traditionally heavier burdens on business and industry.
The prominence of the large, influential European labor unions as par-
ticipants in government also represents a related divergence between the
two cultures. The European consensus-building tradition among govern-
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ment, unions, and employers is unfamiliar to U.S. labor relations. Contract
negotiations in the United States are generally not cooperative discussions,
and far fewer U.S. workers are represented by unions than are their Euro-
pean counterparts. 40 7 Labor's role in the U.S. government and vice versa
has always proved far less active than in Europe.
Other similar divergences are evident. The reduction of government
subsidies to industry constitutes a more significant part of the European
reforms, mainly due to the traditional lessened government role in the
United States. Reflecting the trend, Austrian farmers and German coal
miners receive less government financial support. Italian and French civil
service are undergoing similar reform, harmonizing benefits consistent
with other employment sectors. The United States, however, will not likely
follow European tax increases on capital and the wealthy. To the contrary,
the current economic prosperity in the United States is likely to result in
tax reductions, especially on capital and the wealthy.
Certain convergences, or at least similar developments, between
Europe and the United States exist. These developments, however, vary in
substance. Numerous budget decisions viewed overall may reflect similar
national policy choices, but in some cases constitute little more than spon-
taneous reactions to unfolding events. At other times, policy choices con-
stitute deliberate, bold breaks with the past and portray significant trends
in evolving governmental change. For example, the prompt reunification
of Germany, in cooperation with France and other neighbors, marked a
seismic advance in European cooperation and integration. The fall of the
Berlin Wall and the collapse of the former Soviet Union generated epochal
changes around the world. Simultaneously, common needs and aspira-
tions contributed to common responses across the Atlantic. Decisions to
open markets and compete regionally and internationally became a part of
the changing European landscape. Likewise, the shift of government
power to the regional or local level and the shift away from broad guaran-
tees of social security toward individual initiative and work constituted the
deliberate re-ordering of governmental relationships.
Many of the specific, concrete budget cuts discussed here followed
from such broad movements. For example, reductions in national defense
spending offered relatively easy choices for cuts in both the U.S. and Euro-
pean systems. From French and Austrian offerings of private health and
disability insurance, to the sale of national utilities in Italy and Germany,
privatization of unprofitable government enterprises was a common Euro-
pean response to general economic pressures, especially as foreign capital
became more available. By contrast, although the United States has never
participated in the ownership of major industry or business entities to the
extent European governments have, privatization contributes to the down-
sizing of big government. This movement to privatization represents a
more abstract convergence - the promotion of the central and controlling
407. In the United States, only 10% of private-sector workers are union members. See
Minda, supra note 11, at 180.
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principle that government should withdraw from private economic life,
except where necessary for public safety or national security. This tech-
nique represents a broader, more abstract trend because a reduction in any
government benefit is a form of privatization, as it shifts costs away from
the government. When government-sponsored pension or unemployment
sums are reduced, private resources from personal, church, or other non-
governmental reserves will fill the gap. The emphasis on private economic
resources, free from government direction or support, is a cardinal theme
in both spheres.
This review suggests hypotheses of two substantial convergences
regarding the nature of social welfare, as well as the appropriate roles of the
state, businesses, unions, and workers in social cohesion and government
processes. Evolving relationships between the individual states and the
central governments in Washington and Brussels represent a significant
convergence. This convergence also exhibits some multidirectional move-
ment. In the United States, power and authority are devolving to the states
through the massive transfers of the new welfare laws. Yet the new federal
law maintains its controlling position, imposing a template of overarching
guidelines that states must follow. In Europe, the principle of subsidiaritv
generates similar change as restricting EU competence in favor of the Mem-
ber States. Yet, the central force at work in Europe discussed here remains,
the overarching EU convergence criteria for monetary union. At the same
time subsidiarity is emphasized, the European Union deepened its compe-
tencies and added power to the central government granted in the 1997
Treaty of Amsterdam.408 Indeed, the Treaty marks progress toward polit-
ical integration. Thus, one may observe evolving convergence through the
unfolding complex processes.
More relevant to the social issues discussed herein, the constitutional
sanctity of social cohesion in Europe may have suffered fatal encroachment
in this period. Former Chancellor Kohl is one of several European leaders
who initiated broad legislative efforts toward a major re-orientation and
restructuring of national economic relationships and performance. One
German scholar foresees the social welfare future with a containment of
social spending, increased competition with less regulation, "and, under
the auspices of self-reliance, a shift in . . . financing" to private
provisioning.40 9
Perhaps the social welfare model had to change because of the end of
the Cold War and the need for a new social and legal order. When so
much of the external context changes substantially, paradigms will adjust
408. The Treaty would add some enforcement procedures to counter "serious and
persistent" Member State breaches of the constitutional principles democracy, human
rights, and rule of law. The Council would be granted authority to legislate in areas
previously included in the third pillar (freedom, security, and justice, including the
Schengen Convention border harmonization), and would allow jurisdiction of the Court
of Justice in these matters. New Community activity is required by the Treaty in the
employment area, as discussed above, and social issues competences were expanded.
See BaEmANN Er AL., supra note 6, at 10-11.
409. Hinrichs, supra note 162, at 657.
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or break down. Technological innovation, globalization of trade, the domi-
nance of competition in the market, and the prospect of peace and a uni-
fied Europe all mix to create a supercharged atmosphere for spontaneous
combustion. The political and social struggle portrayed above, with its pro-
tests and surprise election results, stimulates this environment for growth.
The movement to reform, the resulting protest, and the struggle to resolve
the conflict reflect predictable patterns: action, reaction, compromise -
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The catharsis ultimately produces
advancement, 410 albeit slowly and sometimes painfully, but usually for the
better.
On this side of the Atlantic, the reform of welfare marks the end of one
period and the transition to another yet undetermined. The 1997 transfer
of substantial money and authority to the states reverses the opposite trend
dating back to the post Civil War federalism struggle, and the end of the
federal guarantee of minimal social protection to the poor marks a shift in
fifty years of policy. The agreement among Democrats and Republicans
that the reforms benefitted both the tax payers and those needing assist-
ance411 represents a paradigm shock, if not shift, in U.S. politics. While
debate about welfare reform in the United States continues, most observers
agreed that the previous entitlement system was problematic: the enor-
mous financial costs, the unbalanced budget, and the "perverse incentives"
rewarding parents who remain unmarried, "and benefits that continue
unaffected by addiction, promiscuity, and other irresponsible behavior that
prolongs dependency.
'412
Federalism shifts of power and resources to local and regional units in
both Europe and the United States mirror one another in some ways. In
both systems, all powers not specifically delegated to the central govern-
ment are presumed to be reserved by the States.413 In recent years, the
general principles have taken on added meaning. The EU mandate for sub-
sidiarity, a matter of constitutional emphasis since the Maastricht Treaty,
restrains all union organs from acting in matters which could be better
achieved by local government, even if nominally falling within a Commu-
410. For twenty-six centuries, in Europe, we have developed a theory of soci-
ety.... made not in a linear way from ancient Greece onward, but in an accretive
way, forming and reforming itself in a dialectical relation to social reality....
The idea of democracy.. .producing dramatic social effects within national soci-
eties: action and reaction, dissent and revolution, social progress and social
conflict.
Philip Allott, The European Community is Not the True European Community, 100 YALE LJ.
2485, 2490 (1991).
411. See Kost & Munger, supra note 29, at 3-4.
412. Loftus, supra note 30, at 388.
413. Constitutive charters so provide. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X ("powers not
delegated... are reserved, to the States .. "); TEU, supra note 7, art. 2 (sets forth
permissible goals of Community activity); id. arts. 3 & 3a (list permissible activities in
pursuit of those goals); id. art.3b (restricts Community action "within the limits of the
powers conferred upon it by the Treaty," and "[i]n areas which do not fall within the




nity competence.414 Such a potential "rollback" of power to the States rep-
resents a major shift away from behemoth Brussels, and one expert
observes that "the concept of subsidiarity has taken on'unprecedented sig-
nificance."415 In the United States, the 1996 welfare law reform marks a
major shift in a half century of legal and social policy, transferring billions
of dollars and widespread authority to the states.
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These concurrent movements do suggest potentially significant con-
vergences of the two legal families breaking with longstanding traditions by
reshaping, restructuring, and downsizing - all in the name of the same
ideals: global competition, balanced budgets, reduced government waste,
technological progress, economic and personal fitness, and initiative. The
uncertain extent of these shifts presents deeper questions. Does the consti-
tutional scope of governmental action face renewed challenge? And more
narrowly, has the fundamental role of social protection in the European
scheme of constitutional democracy been undermined? Does the new
scheme represent a move away from the Sozialstaat concept and toward a
residual, privatized approach to social protection?417 Is this a philosophy
shift - a shift in Europe from social solidarity and security to economic
growth? Has economics become the senior partner over social objectives?
Has democratic decision-making yielded to elitist banker decision-making?
To whatever degree this movement in Europe progresses, the present
forces surely lead toward a more free market direction, prompting the next
question: has the fundamental role of social protection changed in both
cultures? One commentator asks: have the conservative doctrines of the
nineties changed the foundations for state activity by limiting the spectrum
of welfare reform options to one direction?418 Perhaps ascending political
and economic principles now limit more than welfare reform options. On
both fronts, as the legislative "adjustments" unfold, the public's sense of
security and trust can erode, thus diminishing confidence in the stability
of the systems.4
19
European workers are losing their previous high level of job security,
illustrating a more discrete convergence with job security in the United
States. In both economic cultures, efficiency and flexibility have become
mantra. This evolving business management philosophy infuses rigor into
untold aspects of corporate, industrial, and business life, increasing pro-
414. EC Treaty, supra note 87, art. 3b, as amended by the TEU. See BEvaum Er AL.,
supra note 6, at 46. Monetary union policy matters should generally be within the
"exclusive competence" of Community organs, so subsidiarity principles do not apply to
them. Smits, supra note 3, at 11-12. See also Nicolas Bernard, The Future of European
Economic Law in the Light of the Principle of Subsidiarity, 33 COMMON Mcr. L. REV. 633
(1996) (explaining that subsidiarity can help the Union answer the calls for more decen-
tralized decision-making, without fragmenting the Community legal order, as is
threatened by the variable geometry of opt-outs and derogations.).
415. BEamaNN Er AL., supra note 6, at 47.
416. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
417. See Mushaben, supra note 49, at 2.
418. See id.
419. See Hinrichs, supra note 162, at 682-83.
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duction and profits, while affording less social comfort and security. In
this way, the European trend converges toward U.S. practice.
Additional similarities in the legal adjustments of the two spheres are
numerous: reductions and restrictions in unemployment benefits and
qualifications, increased insistence that refusal to work disqualifies
rewards, more means testing for financial assistance, strengthened anti-
fraud provisions; and reductions in sick benefits and "welfare" social
assistance to the poor. Forty-nine states have submitted their formal plans,
implementing the vague federal template of required provisions and adding
their individual regional judgments of the time limits for social assistance
and encouragement to work.4 20 Likewise, most of the European Union
States have exercised the same options to control social spending and still
offer care for the most needy.
While health care reform proceeds unevenly on the two continents,
similarities arise: new or increased patient co-payments for physician care
and medicine, limited schedules of options available to doctors and
patients, and more frequent use of contract work with performance stan-
dards. Health care reform, however, poses an uphill battle in both systems,
as the move is under way to transfer as much as possible to private parties
and insurance companies.
Immigrants suffer disproportionally to their population in both sys-
tems. Strong anti-immigration legislation passed in Europe and the United
States limited border entry and, in some cases, offered fewer social bene-
fits. In the United States, efforts to relax 1996's severe restrictions in wel-
fare benefits and food stamps for immigrants have progressed. Similarly in
Europe, the French "Draconian anti-immigration measures," imposed after
the fall of the Iron Curtain, are currently under discussion for some
relaxation.
42 1
Pension reform also represents a principal divergence, yet one aspect
of this reform may lead to a telling attitudinal convergence. A potential
convergence may be the growing acceptance of the notion that disability
pensions are not appropriate as part of the general social padding. Gov-
ernment disability pensions are not just another part of a system to manip-
ulate, and those who can work should not be considered disabled.
Expressed differently, this view reflects the rule of law principle which pro-
vides that the language of the law is truly intended to mean what its words
literally signify. Thus, economic and political systems, not to mention legal
norms, should not be subverted.
Rule of law principles are adaptable to regional culture, and these
notions regarding entitlement to government aid appear to be under re-
interpretation. Italy provides a vivid example of this changing notion,
where the practice of citizens supplementing their income with pension
regardless of actual need or qualification is under assault. Reforms now
420. See DeParle, supra note 30, at Al (stating that many states project they will not
meet the goals of the 1995 welfare law within the specified time limit).
421. See Craig R. Whitney, Deft French Premier Unscathed by Jobless Rate, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1997, at 8. See also Simons, supra note 214, at A6.
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challenge "long-standing cultural expectations" that the State must do
what the economy and society, acting alone, cannot do: "provide the serv-
ices and conditions through which its citizens may aspire" to a prosperous
life.4 22 The same "expectation change" may be evidenced to some degree
in the United States with the early shakeout of welfare rolls in many states,
as described above.
Two further European developments show similar movement to U.S.
practice: the rapid spread of information technology in Europe and the
increased use of management-by-contract, with specified outputs and per-
formance standards. These innovations assist in administering social pro-
grams and help cut costs and reduce fraud.423 Another convergence
slowly evolving may be seen in the wave of new laws abolishing more tradi-
tional working hours in Europe. This seemingly superficial legal adjust-
ment can have surprisingly important social, cultural, and economic
effects on workers and the public. In the United States, for example, week-
end and evening shopping has become the rule, rather than the exception.
VII. Similarity in Policy Targets
The review of actual and proposed cuts on both sides of the Atlantic sug-
gests four categories of policy cuts: social welfare reform, labor market
deregulation, privatization, and military cuts. In their traditional family
care-giver roles, women are particularly affected by the welfare reductions
in the United States. Immigrants, the poor, the young, and the elderly have
also historically been less politically powerful and thus are more vulnerable
to political policy decisions. The various military branches may be
included in the budget cuts because they find themselves in a politically
tenuous position.4
24
Reforms in social assistance, from France to Mississippi, center on
assistance that benefits children. Reductions in child care supplements
and assistance for food, maintenance, and schools all implicate children.
Students complaining about underfunded schools in Germany and the
considerable cuts in the generous benefits to students will likely get little
beyond sympathy, while poor children in the U.S. inner city school suffer a
similar plight. The elderly are most concerned about the intense efforts at
pension reform as battles for the future loom. While pension reform has
not proceeded in the United States, it is high on the national agenda.
Immigrants bear the brunt of reduced outlays in the U.S. overhaul, and
their European counterparts will necessarily feel similar constrictions as
overall social protection benefits for the poor are altered in Europe.
Subsequent potential targets may be health care providers, but the
inherent resistance of these powerful institutions will place much of the
cutting back onto the groups described above. Benefits will be limited
422. Tony Judt, The Social Question Redivivus, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 108.
423. See EC SOCIAL PROTECION, supra note 22, at 14.
424. Europe's "defense industries are reeling from budget cuts." Joseph Fitchett, Bonn
Set to Clear Funds For the Eurofighter 2000, IN'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 8, 1997, at 1.
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more than profits, if the past is any predictor. Yet, containing health costs
in both the United States and EU presents an irresistible issue for
politicians.
Conclusion
The European and U.S. developments in the time frame reviewed here
show the potency of the current forces of global competition, transnational
regulation, and government retrenchment - stimulating change in eco-
nomic, political, and social structures.4 25 Yet, the clear lens for which this
review searched ends up more a prism refracting categories with shades of
similarities and differences. One must resist superficial conclusions. Cau-
tion with generalities is always necessary for reasoned analysis. A French
proverb warns of the complexity of comparisons: "Comparaison n'est pas
raison" - translated literally: "A comparison is not an argument; it proves
nothing."4 26 But the proverb also connotes that substantial differences in
quality and nature can render comparisons inapposite and fruitless, as sug-
gested by the idiom "apples and oranges."
This notion applies here with special relevance. Many of these legal
events and their causes have no counterpart in the other system and just do
not adequately compare - they are too different. For example, European
social welfare expectations arise from a different source and history and
do not compare with the U.S. experience. While the seemingly irresistible
forces of global competition, fiscal efficiencies, and technological develop-
ment may generate concurrent patterns of growth and adaptation, these
similarities will always include deep, enriching differences. Nonetheless,
inquiry into any complex scheme of advancing events and trends will bene-
fit from categorization, analysis, and comparison.
This Article searches for early similarities and differences in the two
evolving systems, stimulates questions, and provides focus for further
inquiry in this rapidly developing political and social context. Even
though many developments will not compare fully, examining the diver-
gences and convergences inevitably deepens understanding and therefore
appreciation of the complex movements and counter-movements. The
heavily promoted single currency convergence criteria have prompted
changing norms, policies, and practices. These face resistance as they
implicate real needs and expectations. Adaptation and transformation are
certain to fill agendas for the near future. The same may be expected in the
United States, where the "radical" shift in federalism and social policy has
already started to adapt to moderating influences.
This concurrent pressure to devolve authority and resources from the
federal apex toward to the local or regional level, seen in the ideologies of
425. "[I]ncreasing interconnectness and interdependence [are] driven by capital
flows, technology, investment patterns, growing linkages between societies and more
rapid dissemination of ideas. The acceleration of internationalism in the 1990s has
profound implications for political and economic order at the international, regional
and national levels." Laffan, supra note 3, at 1.
426. DIcTIoNNAIRE (Paul Robert ed., Societe du Nouveau Lettre, 1973).
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the EU's subsidiary and the U.S. states' rights, may in itself be the expected
reaction to the previously over-sized, unresponsive, unaccountable bureau-
cracies long criticized in Washington and Brussels. On the other hand,
considering the central role of harmonization in these times of burgeoning
transnational commerce, the devolution can go only so far. An equilibrium
must be reached.
Advancing internationalism necessarily raises issues about the gap
between functional efficiency on the one hand and accountability and
legitimacy on the other.427 The synergy of the European Union's evolving
growth and economic globalization will necessarily restrict national deci-
sion-making and will limit effective options for growth. In the United
States, the rise of conservatism and the flow of power to the states imposes
similar restrictions. Improved national economic performance and compe-
tition are favored universally, as is a high level of social protection and
cohesion. Because the economic and political environment of the 1990s
refuses to allow full measure of both, the disruptive debate over accommo-
dating priorities is a natural part of the process.
How far will these tides flow? Will the U.S. and European economic
reforms spawn widespread prosperity? Will the fruits of the economic
growth be distributed broadly to all classes of the people? Is there substan-
tial risk that present processes and structures of the economic growth will
enlarge the groups of the lower economic classes, widening the distance
between the wealthy, or even middle class, and those in the lower strata?428
Gross disproportionality of resources among members of groups inevitably
leads to social reaction. What forms would that take and how far could
that proceed? Should both the U.S. and European governments strive to
protect every citizen's basic right to adequate housing, food, education, and
medical care, regardless of wealth?429 Are such guarantees even possible?
These questions inevitably respond to the rapid and widespread
change in the current economic, legal, and social order, and they Will gen-
erate debate on every level. Perhaps most critically, that debate must also
include discussion about the philosophical, moral, or spiritual direction of
the movements. Ever-present ethos requires careful attention. Ethos
remains the most fundamental force in the evolution and unmistakably
will pre-ordain the nature and quality of the long-term creation. National-
ism may yield to regionalism, and statism's powerful forces may relent. But
what ethos controls these current governmental initiatives and ambitions?
Noble concepts of community and even democracy itself should find a
more prominent place in the judgments of today and the plans for
427. See Laffan, supra note 3, at 11.
428. According to a report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the 1997
surging economy in the United States "[h]as produced vast benefits for the nation's
wealthiest people, while doing little to improve the incomes of poor and lower middle
income people." Richard Perez-Pena, New York's Income Gap Largest in Nation, N.Y.
TiMEs, Dec. 17, 1997, at A14.
429. See Loftus, supra note 30, at 388.
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tomorrow.
430
A final reflection may be considered about the interconnected, yet dis-
organized, evolution of this world-wide legal change. Would this be better
accomplished if it were moderated by or channeled through a more com-
prehensive, coherent, even systematized process? As those in the common
law world know well, ad hoc rule and policy making can produce mul-
tidirectional, conflicting, often ineffective and sometimes counterproduc-
tive results. Functional budget reduction within political parameters may
cause results that do not reflect actual cultural and moral norms. Some-
times politicians choose options carrying the least political fallout: they
cut budgets, or defer responsibility, just because they can do so with rela-
tive impunity. Consensus is unlikely where women and children should
bear so much of the brunt of these current economic shifts. The need to
care adequately for the poor and the elderly is beyond debate. With so
much at stake, more open discussion and circumspect policy deliberation
are warranted. The elevated level of social policy discussion in the EU
presents a constructive alternative to the shallow, sound-bite public dia-
logue in the United States.4 3 1 Without the clarifying and organizing
effects of structured dialogue, the political process too severely limits
accountability.
This review of fiscal restriction and restructuring has not shown sub-
stantially different public policy choices in the two spheres. The new legal
developments do show widespread similarities, with some convergence
and even systemic change in traditional models. The changes alter funda-
mental structures and relationships in both legal cultures. These develop-
ments merit, if not demand, careful investigation and thoughtful
assessment for future direction. Legal and economic experimentation,
resistance, compromise, and adaptation will be the course for the future in
this time of unusually fast development in global trade, technology, and
governmental theory. Symbolically appropriate, this cathartic period at
the transition to the new century signals the beginning of a new interna-
tional era.
430. See Weiler, supra note 3, at 2478-83 (emphasizing concepts of ethos, community
and democracy); Allott, supra note 411, at 2500 (calling for "a new vision of the highest
values of European society . . ").
431. The Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute in Florence,
Italy, exemplifies the many interdisciplinary research centers in Europe that promote
and coordinate in-depth study of European integration and developing public policy,
and organize conferences and other fora for cooperation among academics and policy
makers. The Robert Schuman Centre (last modified Sept. 15, 1997) <http://www.iue.it/
RSC/Welcome.html>.
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